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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The first grandparent visitation rights statute was passed in 1986, giving
grandparents legal rights to visit their grandchildren over the objections of parents.
Now all 50 states have grandparent visitation statutes. The following two cases
describe some of the issues that occur when a case is heard undera grandparent
visitation rights statute.
In King v. King (1992), the grandfather and son had a dispute over the son's
work performance and the grandfather asked the son and his wife to leave the farm.
Before this dispute, the grandfather had daily contact with the grandchild. After the
dispute, visits were discontinued, resulting in the grandfather petitioning for visitation.
The first two courts denied grandfather visitation. The state supreme court granted
grandparent visitation rights because it was in the child's best interest. Justiceson the
state supreme court noted:
"That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve
the quality of its citizens, physical, mentally, and morally, is clear; but
the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.
This statute seeks to balance the fl.indamental rights of parents,
grandparents, and the child" (King v King, 1992,p. 632).
The justices also reasoned that the grandparent and grandchild both benefit from their
relationship. Grandchildren are exposed to the insights of the grandparents.2
Grandparents' loneliness can be reduced by the companionship of their grandchildren.
All the members of the court did not agree. The dissenting justice preferred the
traditional legal perspective that protected parents' fi.indamental rights to raise their
children as they see fit without interference from anyone, including grandparents
(King v. King, 1992).
In Hawk v. Hawk (1993), a father worked a bowling alley with the
grandfather. Although the two families spent regular time together at Sunday worship,
bowling, and visiting every Sunday and Wednesday, family disputes were frequent
among the two Hawk households. Because of poor work perfonnance, the grandfather
terminated the father's job. Grandparent-grandchild visits were discontinued because
of(a) family disputes between the grandfather and the parents, and (b) the parents'
concern over a paternal brother who resided with the grandparents and who had a drug
addiction. The paternal grandparents sought visitation with grandchildren via the
courts. The trial court awarded visitation and the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court order. The trial court not only superseded the parents' wishes, but noted:
Grandparents don't have to answer to anybody when they have the
children. They can take the children tovisitfriends of theirs, they can
take the children anywhere they please. They can also take the children
on vacation during the time that they have them for the two week
period of time, and they're not restricted as to where they can take
them, because the Court is filly convinced that they would not do
anything or take these children anywhere that would adversely affect
these children. (Hawk v. Hawk, 1993,p. 577)Sociohistoncal Changes that Contribute to Contemporary Grandparenting
At no time in our country's history until 1986 did grandparents have
legal rights in relation to their grandchildren. During this century, however,
proximal and distal changes in families set the foundation for theemergence of
grandparent visitation statutes. These thctors included lower fertility rates,
longer life expectancy, increased family disruption, and increased political
power of older adults (Hooyman & Kiyalg 1996; Erikson, Luttbe& & Tedin,
1991; Aldous, 1998).
Lower fertility rates and increased longevity have combined to create a
situation in which there are more older adults who are grandparents. With the increase
in life expectancy, there were larger cohorts of older adults. Hooyman and Kiyak
(1996) reported that 94% of all older adults with children are grandparents and 50%
are great-grandparents. Szinovacz (1998) suggested that most grandchildren will reach
adulthood with more than two grandparents living and around 75% will reach 30years
of age andstillhave a living grandparent. Additional changes included an increased
number of three and four generations (Roberto & Stroes, 1995). Thus grandparents
have become less challenged with dividing their time or resources among several
grandchildren (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986).
Family disruption due to divorce, separation, unwed parents, teenpregnancy,
mental illnesses related to alcohol and substance abuse, incarceration, and child
maltreatment, have become more visible social concerns (Cherlin & Furstenberg,
1986; Johnson & Barer, 1987; Minkler & Roe, 1993). In 1988, 37per 1, 000
marriages ended in divorce (Behrman & Quinn, 1994). Because grandparent-4
grandchild relationships are mediated by parents, divorce and other forms of family
disruption change the ties and exchanges between generations (Giarrusso, Silverstein,
& Bengston, 1996; Hooyman & Kiyak, 1996; King & Elder, 1995). Matthews and
Sprey (1984) noted that the custodial parent determines the frequency of visits
between grandparents and grandchildren; when the custodial parent is the child of the
grandparent, then grandparent-grandchild visitation is more likely to continue than if
the noncustodial parent is the child of the grandparent.
Because of the increase in family disruption, grandparents have become more
important resources to families by providing tangible and social support. Johnson and
Barer (1987) showed that grandparents continue to exchange services with their adult
children after a divorce. Johnson (1988) found that maternal grandparents are asked to
contribute more tangible and social support than they had anticipated in theircareer or
retirement.
With the increased number of grandparents, there has been an increase in
grandparents' political powers. Because younger adults are preoccupied with personal
or more immediate issues including securing a job or mate, it is not surprising that
older adults are more politically active than younger adults (Erikson, Luttbeg, &
Tedin, 1991). The political powers of grandparents have gained the attention of state
and national governments. One indicator of this attention was the President's
designation of 1995 as the "Year of the Grandparent." Another indicator was the rapid
acceptance of grandparent visitation right in all 50 states (Burns, 1991; Bostock, 1994;
Hartileld, 1996).The Influence of Grandparent Visitation Right Statuteson Parental Rights and the
Definition of Family
Prior to the enactment of grandparent visitation statutes, laws reflected
society's vision of the family as a private sphere. Parents have constitutional rights
that are protected from unwarranted government intrusion. To intrude, thestate must
have a compelling interest. Grandparent visitation rights give grandparents, insome
circumstances, the right to visit their grandchildren against the wishes of the parents,
which weakens the legal protections afforded parents. In thisway, grandparent
visitation rights have changed the social construction of the private sphere of fmiIy
life.
Grandparent visitation rights are shifting the way the law defines families
(BohI, 1996; Shandling, 1986). Prior to the enactment of grandparent visitation
statutes, the courts considered family to be biological or adoptive parents with
children. The courts have provided very limited legal protections to extended families
and they have not extended those protections to provide grandparents witha
constitutional right to family (Moore v. the City of East Cleveland, 1977). In granting
grandparent visitation rights, however, the courts are treating grandparentsas
members of families and shifting the legal definition of the family (BohI, 1996;
Purnell & Bagby, 1993).
Grandparent visitation statutes directly influence onlya small portion of
families who are using the courts to win access to their grandchildren. Thesestatutes
indirectly influence all families, however, by changing the protections givento
parental rights and shifting the definition of the family to include grandparents.6
CHAPTER TWO
Review of Literature
The review of literature is divided into three major sections. The first section
examines relevant literature on grandparent-grandchild relationships. The second
section reviews how grandparents obtain legal standing to petition for visitation with
their grandchildren. The last section deals with some of the criticisms of the best
interest of the child standard, which is used by courts to determine whether visitation
should be granted.
Grandparenthood and the Grandparent-Grandchild Relationship
Smyer and Hofland (1982) found that approximately 95% of grandparents see
their grandchildren every week and 50% of grandparents see their grandchild on a
daily basis. Geographic proximity is more important than the parent-grandparent
relationship in shaping the frequency of visits between grandparents and
grandchildren.
Grandparents hold an important role within most families, although it may
very well be symbolic (Bengston, 1985; Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Denham &
Smith, 1989). For instance, some researchers have suggested that grandparents may
act like the "national guard" or the militia, protecting, caring, and enacting policies
while others may act as the "arbitrator" negotiating between parents and grandchildren
(Bengston, 1985; Hagested, 1985; Troll, 1983). Wiebel-Orlando (1997) found that7
some grandparents hold the role of "cultural conservator" in order to teach their
grandchildren about their Native American culture and to build personal and
community stability.
Grandparenting styles. Cherlin and Furstenberg (1986) explained
grandparents' influence on grandchildren as grandparenting occupations and styles.
These researchers noted that grandparenthood is similar to an occupational career that
has distinctive stages based on the age of the grandparent relative to the grandchild.
The first stage extends from the grandchild's developmental stages of infancy to
adolescence with a high level of grandparental involvement. The second stage spans
the adolescent years of the grandchild that may involve a decline in grandparents'
involvement. Adulthood, the final stage, may mean more grandparental involvement if
grandparent-grandchild proximity is close.
Researchers also have identified various grandparenting styles (Cherlin &
Furstenberg, 1986; Neugarten & Weinstein, 1964). For instance, the involved
grandparenting style refers to engaged and involved grandparents who help parents to
raise their grandchildren, thereby acting with some authority. In Black families,
researchers have found that grandparents are more authoritative and influential than in
White families (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Kivett, 1993; Hunter & Taylor, 1998).
The companionate grandparenting style tends to allow parents to be the
grandchild's primary decision-maker and authority figure; these grandparents follow
the norm of noninterference. Grandparenting is not the central role of the
companionate grandparenting style (Troll, 1983). The companionate grandparent isS
more like the family watchdog who is available to consult with the parents (Hagestad,
1985).
The remote or distant style refers to grandparents who have little contactor
involvement with their grandchild; however, this grandparent maybe uncomfortable
with this distant position (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986). Asian grandparentsmay
adhere to this style based on cultural norms toward intergenerational responsibility,
language differences, and other influences related to immigration (Kamo, 1998).
Mediating fhctors in the grandparent-grandchild relationship. Thereare
several factors that influence relationships between grandparents and grandchildren.
Proximity, ethnicity, race, age, and health were found to mediate grandparent-
grandchild relationships. Family crises, likewise, influences these relationships.
Proximity. The influence of grandparents on families is mediated by proximity
(e.g., Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Johnson, 1983; Kivett, 1985; 1991; Whitbeck,
Hoyt, & Huck, 1993). Cherlin and Furstenber (1986) found proximity influences the
frequency of visits between grandparents and grandchildren while Kivette (1985)
found it to be an important factor in predicting relationshipsamong grandfathers and
grandchildren. Alternatively, proximity was not an important mediating fctor for
Black grandparents (Strom, Collinsworth, Strom, & Griswold, 1995)or for
relationships between White grandparents and teenaged grandchildren (Whitbeck,
Hoyt, & Huck, 1993).
Ethnicity, race, and grandparent-grandchi idren relationships. Cultural
traditions among ethnic or racially diverse groups influence the grandparent-
grandchild relationship (e.g., Burton & Bengston, 1985; Chan, 1997; Wiebel-Orlando,9
1997). For instance, the salience of grandparent influenceon families is stronger in
ethnic or racial families than in White families. Black, Hispanic, and NativeAmerican
grandparents may act more as surrogate parents than do White grandparents (Cherlin
& Furstenberg, 1986; Lubben & Becerra, 1987; Markides & Mmdcl, 1987). Cultural
traditions and values, along with economic need, also help tocreate a climate that
allows more grandparental involvement in ethnically and racially diverse familiesthan
in White families (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Markides & Mindel, 1987).
Age and grandparent-grandchild relationships. Theage of the grandparent and
grandchild are also mediating fuctors in the grandparent-grandchild relationship.As
grandparents age, their involvement with grandchildren declines (Johnson, 1983;
Sprey & Mathews, 1982; Thomas, 1986). Some researchers found that older, Black
grandparents were satisfied with their grandparenting role (Strom, Collinsworth,
Strom, & Griswold, 1995). In the same study, grandparents felt successful with their
roles with younger grandchildren as well as with older grandchildren. Other
researchers found that younger grandchildren may elicitgreater pleasure and
involvement if the grandparent and grandchild live in close proximity (Cherlin&
Furstenberg, 1986).
HealthAdditionally, as grandparents age, they may experience lowerenergy
and have health concerns, thereby reducing their involvement in their grandchild's
life. Kivett (1993) found that the relationship between older rural Whitegrandmothers
and grandchildren declined with the health of the grandmother. After controllingfor
proximity, however, some researchers founda low association between the health of
grandparents and the associational or functional aspects of the grandparent-grandchild10
relationship (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Troll, 1985). illness suchas Alzheimer's,
dementia, and depression may also influence the grandparent-grandchild relationship
(Kivett, 1998). Alternatively, the grandchild or grandparentmay elect to spend time
with friends, at work, or doing other community activities.
Family crises. Another factor that influences grandparent-grandchild
relationships is family disruption. Around 17 million children under theage of 18 live
with a divorced or separated parent or stepparent (Behrman & Quinn, 1994).Johnson
and Barer (1987) found that paternal grandmothers maintain relationships with their
former daughters-in-law more often than maternal grandparents maintain relationships
with their former daughter-in-law. If relationshipswere retained, grandparents
continued to exchange services. Grandparents arean invaluable source of social
support for families experiencing life crises such as divorce as wellas normative life
changes (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Johnson, 1995). Thereappears to be a
difference in grandparent involvement after deathsas opposed to divorce and
separation. Grandparents' involvement may increase witha child's death and decline
with divorce (Johnson, 1995).
Cherlin and Furstenberg (1986) found that maternal grandparents provided
more support to nonintact families facing divorce or separation than paternal
grandparents. One reason for this difference was that paternal grandparents lived
further away from their children. Johnson and Barer (1987) also found that divorce
reduced the social supports between divorced parents and grandparents. In general,
grandparents' response tofamilydisruption varied because of age of grandparents,
ancestral ties, and the norms that each family has for grandparenting (Johnson, 1998).11
Grandparent-parent relationship. Grandparents' relationship with theirown
child, the parent of the grandchild, was an important factor in the grandparent-
grandchild relationship (Hagestad, 1985; Thompson & Walker, 1987). For example,
Thompson and Walker (1987) found that grandmother's feelings for herown daughter
influenced her feelings for her grandchild. When grandparents andparents have close,
warm relationships, then grandparents' involvement is more likely than when this
relationship is charged with more negative affect (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986).
Grandparents' influence on grandchildren may also be byway of their economic
support to the child's parents. Bass and Caro (1996) found that the economic value of
grandparents who provide care for grandchildren can be equated to $17.4to $29.1
billion annually.
Grandparent-grandchild relationship. Grandparents also provide social and
tangible support to their grandchildren. Social support from grandparentsto
grandchildren may involve phone calls, visits, recreational activities, and imily
dinners and gatherings (Cherlin & Furstenburg, 1986; Denham & Smith, 1989;
Roberto & Stroes, 1995). Sometimes grandparents help to resolve disputes between
parents and grandchildren or talk over issues raised by their grandchild. Some
grandparents may act as playmates to grandchildren while others actas role models or
mentors (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Tomlin, 1998). Transmitting histoiy, values,
and morals is also among the direct influences of grandparentson grandchildren
(Bengston, 1985; Denham & Smith, 1989; Hagsted, 1985; Roberto & Stroes, 1995).
Tangible support from grandparents to grandchildren involves gift giving that
includes money. Grandparents may help grandchildren with chores, teach themnew12
skills, or show them how to play a game (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Roberto &
Stroes, 1995). Watson and Koblinsky (1997) found that grandmotherswere more
likely than grandfathers to be involved in teaching grandchildren than about the
importance of other people's feelings and lifelong learning.
Additional research on grandparents' influence on child development is
needed. In general, research has shown that grandparents who assisted their children
with parenting or grandparents who raised their grandchildren have hadsome positive
influence on their grandchildren's development. For example, the behaviors of
grandchildren sometimes improved with the grandparents'presence in single-parent
families. Grandparents positively influenced the emotional and cognitive development
of grandchildren including single or teen parents (Stolba & Amato, 1993).
Mediated by age, grandparents sometimes have a negative influenceon
grandchildren. Grandchildren in middle school fhiled to benefit from thepresence of
grandparents. Sometimes the presence of grandparents failed to mediate behavioral
problems of grandchildren when the mothers used drugs or felt burdened by caring for
grandparents with Alzheimer's disease (Stolba & Amato, 1993).
There are researchers who argue that some grandparents suchas those who
take on the remote or distant grandparenting style may havean adverse or no impact
on grandchildren (Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989; Thompson, Scalora,
Limber, & Castrianno, 1991). According to the research, grandparents sometimes
undermine parental authority (Harrigan, 1992) and lower teen mother$' self-concept
(Voran & Phillips, 1993). Additionally, parents and grandparents in intergenerational13
households sometimes reinforced negative parenting styles or created stress due to
conflicting parenting styles.
Summary. The symbolic associations attached to grandparents as the national
guard, arbitrators, or cultural conservators shows the importance of grandparenthood
in the development of thefamilyand grandchild. Grandparent-grandchild relationships
may be expressed in terms of grandparenting styles that range from distant to
involved. Factors that influenced the grandparent-grandchild relationship included
proximity, ethnicity and race, gender, age, health, and the grandparent-parent
relationship. Grandparents may provide parents with social and tangible supports.
Grandparents may also provide grandchildren with social and economic supports that
range from phone calls to gifts. Regardless, grandparents have the potential to
influence grandchildren and hold an important role in families.
On the other hand, grandparents may adversely influence the development of
their grandchildren by undermining parental authority or by creating additional stress
or conflict within families. Grandparents may have no positive impact on their
grandchildren because of mother's involvement in drugs, grandparents' own illnesses,
or because of distant grandparenting styles. These mixed research findings serve as a
reminder to social scientist and legal professionals that grandparent visitation should
be a case-by-case process of decisionmaking.
A Brief Overview of Landmark Family Law Cases
The influence of the law on families is explained first through a brief overview
of landmark family law cases. These landmark cases help to explain how state14
interests expressed in statutes sometimes compete against the individual rights of
parents and children. This section ends with a discussion of how grandparent visitation
rights have shifted the traditional relationship between the state and parents.
Individual rights. Citizens' rights are rooted in the founding documents of
American democracy, the United States Constitution and Declaration of
Independence. These documents protect citizens' individual rights against
unwarranted government intrusion. The Constitution protects citizens' rights via the
application of four basic principles of America's democracy:
Equality of Rights and Opportunity: Recognition and implementation in
our public and private lives that all people are created equal before God
and should be treated accordingly by the American government.
E Pluribus Unum: Despite our diversity, there is a national unity that
focuses on the principles of equality, liberty, and the common good.
Balance of Individual Liberty and Protection of the Common Good: It is
the responsibility of the government to protect the well-being of citizens
using a system of checks-and-balances to guard individual liberties.
Religious Freedom: Citizen's have the right to practice the religious faith
of their choice (Williamson, 1997).
In family law, these are principles that have directed the lives of individuals in
American fmilies. These principles require courts to weigh state interests in
protecting all citizens against the individual rights of parents and children.
Recognizing the influence of capitalism, politics, and national culture, legislators
enacted statutes based on perceived needs or demands of the citizensas a whole.15
Citizens, in turn, challenged statutes that intrudedupon their constitutional rights, and
courts determined how to balance the interests of the state and the individual rights of
citizens.
State interests. State interests in protecting the well-being of all citizensare
expressed in statutes. When a citizen claims that a statute unjustly intrudesupon a
constitutional right, the court weighs the state's interests against the individual's rights.
In determining the balance, the court uses different tests that dependon the legal
question asked and the protections afforded the individual right in question. Because
fundamental rights are highly protected, the state must havea compelling interest for
intruding upon a citizen's right (Harvard Law Review, [}ILR] 1980; Mintz, 1992). The
Supreme Court has recognized individual autonomy as a fundamental right in matters
pertaining to marriage (e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 1967; Zablockiv. Redhail, 1978),
procreation Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965), contraception (Careyv. Population
Services International, 1977), abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973),familyrelations (Moore
v. the City of East Cleveland, 1977), and raising children (e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska.
1923; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925).
Nevertheless, court decisions have placed limits on parents' fundamental rights
to childrearing and fmily autonomy to protect the overall well-being of American
citizens (Harvard Law Review, (HLR) 1980; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 1905; Prince
v. Massachusetts, 1944; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972. For instance, in Prince v.
Massachusetts (1944) a minor child was distributing religious literature ina public
area under the supervision of a guardian in violation of the child labor law that led to
her arrest. The guardian claimed that her Fourteenth Amendment protection against16
unwarranted government intrusion to bring up the child as she desired and the child's
rights to observe her religious practices were violated. The Supreme Court held that
the state's interest in controlling the conduct of children in the streets and public
places reached beyond its authority over adults or the privacy rights of parents and
guardians. Furthermore, child labor laws were designed to protect children and the
whole community by safeguarding children from abuse and giving them opportunities
to become well developed citizens.
To protect children's rights, the state may act as "parent of the country" (Black
et al., 1991) and invoke its parens patriae powers or police powers to protect the
interests of all citizens (HLR, 1980). In the case of children, the state is the ultimate
parent and protector (HLR, 1980; Mnookin & Weisburg, 1993). Justices also use the
best interest of the child standard to protect children from threat of harm or to findan
alternative that minimizes potential harm to a child (Mnookin & Weisburg, 1993).
In Jefferson v. Griffin (1981), a mother refbsed to undergo a Caesarian section
and blood transfusion because of her religious beliefs. Justices determined that the
mother had to undergo the Caesanan section to save the life of her unborn child who
was entitled to protection by the state. The state used its parens patriae powers,
becoming the ultimate parent of the child, to take custody of the child for its
protection. This action directly conflicted with the parent's right to religious
convictions.
Having established that state interests as expressed in statutes sometimes
conflict with individual rights, the remainder of this discussion focuses on cases that
exemplify how courts seek to balance the rights of parents and children against state's17
interests. Cases involving parents' privacy rights, liberty interests, and religious
freedom rights are followed by a discussion of children's rights.
Parental rights. Parental rights have been categorized as privacy rights and
liberty interests. Parents also have the right to practice their religion without
unwarranted government inference.
Privacy rights. Citizens have the right to personal privacyor a guaranteed zone
of privacy (Carey v. Population Services International, 1977). Privacy rightsare not
directly specified in the Constitution but are constructedor interpreted rights within
the confines of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments; the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights; and the rights reserved to citizens under the Ninth Amendment (Griswoldv.
Connecticut, 1965). Rights related to procreation (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965),
abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973), and contraception (Carey v. Population Services
International, 1977; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972) are one order of privacy rights. Justices
have protected procreation rights for both married and unmarried adults (Griswoldv.
Connecticut, 1965) while at the same time addressing the sanctity of both marital
relations and marital privacy (HLR, 1980). The state also hasan interest in the
survival of humanity (HLR, 1980). In Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), restingon the
Griswold (1965) decision, justices struck down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
the dispersing of contraception to unmarried citizens because all citizens havea
natural right to reproduce or not reproduce.
The detennination of privacy rights in relation to procreation and contraception
set the foundation for Roe v. Wade (1973). The Court found that, just as contraception
had a direct relationship to procreation, so did abortion. Therefore,a woman's18
decision concerning abortion falls under the protection of privacy rights. Despite
common beliefs, the state has an interest in protecting the health and lives of women
that was expressed in this decision. Consequently, justices elected to protecta
woman's privacy right regarding the decision to an abortion in the first trimester
because carrying a baby full term is more dangerous than havinga first trimester
abortion. The state must protect a woman's health after the first trimester because
abortion becomes more dangerous to a woman as thepregnancy advances.
Libertyinterests. Individuals also have liberty interests in parenting. Beginning
in the early 1900s, family law began to provide additional protection to parent-child
relationships (McCarthy, 1988). According to justices, parents' desire for and right to
the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children warranted legal
protection (e.g., Stanley v Illinois, 1972). This reconstruction of legal decision-making
is exemplified in the following family law cases.
In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), a Nebraska statute required that only English be
taught in schools. The state had an interest in educating its citizens so that theymay
become productive members of society. Parents of a minor child hired an instructor to
teach German who was later arrested and convicted of violating this Nebraska statute.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, although the statute had good intentions, it
overextended its powers and violated the teacher's right to teach another language and
the parent's liberty interests in teaching their children another language. Furthermore,
learning another language did not cause harm to the health, morals, or development of
the child.19
Parents' right to raise and educate sometimes conflict with the state's interest
in having a literate citizenry (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, (1925). For example,
Oregon's Compulsory Education Act required all children between theages of 8 and
16 to attend public schools allowing exceptions for children with special needsor who
have already completed eight years of schooling. Justices held that this act
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control" (Piercev. Society of Sisters.
1925, p. 6).
Parents' liberty interests also include personal and family relations (Lovingv.
Virginia, 1967; Moore v. the City of East Cleveland, 1977). Citizens have the right to
associate with or disassociate themselves from whomever they choose. For instance,
Loving (1967) involved a 'White man married to a Black woman. Their marriage
violated a Virginia law that prohibited and punished interracial marriages. The
Supreme Court held that this statute violated the personal right to marry, equal
protection, and due process rights by promoting White supremacy. This quotation
captures the essentials of personal privacy: "Under the Constitution," Warren
concluded, "the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of anotherrace resides
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the state" (Lovingv. Virginia, 1967, p.
6).
Religious freedom.A parent's privacy rights and liberty interests make up only
two domains of constitutional protections afforded parental citizens. Parents also have
religious freedom rights which are woven into the social fiber of America. Basedon
America's concept of separation of church and state, the state is not to interfere with20
religious institutions. Likewise, religious institutions are not to exercise authority
through the state (Black et aL, 1991). All citizens are endowed with religious freedom
rights under the First Amendment; fmily law cases are no exception.
Religious freedom, like privacy rights and liberty interests, are not absolute.
Accordingly, the courts seek to balance the state's interests against parent's religious
freedom rights. Recalling the readers' attention to Jefferson v. Griffin (1981), justices
allowed the state to intrude on the religious practices of parents. On the other hand, the
religious practices of Amish parents were protected against a state's compulsory
education statute in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). The state interest in having
compulsory education served to educate children, to reduce the incidence of child
labor that might displace adult workers, and to reduce the chance of idleness. Despite
these state interests, Amish children in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) receivedan eighth
grade education which was sufficient to meet their basic needs. Children were trained
to use farm whichledto the community's economic self-sufficiency and posed no
undue burden to society. Amish children were trained to use farm equipment, thereby
removing the compelling state interest of threat of harm or danger to a child. They
were not displacing workers in the nearby community with child labor, but
maintaining the fanning tradition of the Amish.Basedlargely on these facts, the
Supreme Court held that the compulsory education statute violated Amish parents'
rights to determine the religious upbringing of their children.
Rights of children. Children have individual rights or personal interests, but
these are not as strong as the rights of adults. For instance, children may avoid
contractual obligations. Children usually do not manage their earnings or property.21
Based on age constraints, children may not vote, hold office, work in certain
occupations, drive a car, or consume liquor (Mnoolcin & Wiesburg, 1993). Children
have the right to: (a) be heard, (b) religion, (c) dueprocess, and (d) to family
autonomy including procreation, contraception, abortion, and marriage. Right to be
heard. Children's rights have evolved over time and the determination of these rights
is often embedded in other cases. For instance, in the dissent of Wisconsinv. Yoder
(1972), justices established children's right to be heard. Justice Douglas pointed out
the conflict between the individual rights of parents and child. Children's liberty
interests in attending school may override their parents' right to religious freedom.
Right to religionCitizens have the constitutionally protected right to practice
their religion. Children similarly have a right to exercise their religion. In Princev.
Massachusetts (1944), justices also protected children's religious freedom rights.
Due process rights. Allcitizens have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Before the state can intrude upon these rights, citizens havea right to due
process of law. Children have some due process rights, meaning access to fair and just
laws and procedures. In the case of In re Gault (1967),a minor child was arrested,
without an adult present or other legal representation, for improper telephoneusage.
The child did not receive notification about the date of his hearing. The U.S. Superior
Court held that children have some guaranteed dueprocess rights such as the right to
(a) notice of charges, (b) counsel, (c) confrontation, and (d) cross-examination.
Right to free speechTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District (1969) shaped children's right to free speech. With their parents' knowledge,
three students elected to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to22
school. The principal drafted a school policy that any student wearing a band would be
suspended and sent home. Supreme Court justices reasoned that the arinbands were
neither disruptive, aggressive, nor representative of a group demonstration that
hindered the order or economics of the school; therefore, the student's First
Amendment right to free speech had been denied: "Students in the public schools do
not shed their constitutional rights of freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,p.
3, 1969).
Unlike in Tinker (1969), justices in Ilazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
(1988) placed limits on children's free speech rights to protect the interests of the
majority. Students were notallowedto print articles in the school newspaper that dealt
with sensitive material concerning teenage pregnancy and divorce. Besides the
sensitive material, school officials were concerned about the privacy of other students.
The Supreme Court held that school officials acted reasonably in attempting to
monitor student's behavior that directly related to school assignments. School officials
also acted reasonably to control the moral, ethical, and legal behaviors of students in
the journalism class.
Child's right to family autonomy. Children's right to family autonomy differs
from that of adults. Statutes regulate children's right to marry by having age
requirements and by requiring parental consent. In fact, most statutes require parental
consent for children under 16 years of age to marry (HLR, 1980). Delaying minors'
right to marry differs from delaying a person's right of abortion, because abortions
have time constraints directed by law and far more adverse consequences.23
Consequently, having minors obtain parental consentor wait until they are legally
adults prove to be an inconvenience more than a violation of rights. In general,state
statutes that restrict the rights of parents and children seek to protect citizens from
poor decision making and to promote self-sufficiency. State interests protect children
in areas in which adults cannot be protected suchas school attainment and reducing
teen pregnancy.
Despite age requirements, the Supreme Court has reasoned that children,
meaning minors under 16 years of age, have the right to procreation, contraception,
and abortion Bellotti v. Baird, 1979; Carey v. Population Services International, 1977;
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 1976). Careyv. Population
Services International (1977) was in response toa statute that prohibited children from
acquiring nonprescribed contraception. The state interest in enacting this statutewas to
regulate the morality of children. Relying on Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth (1976), justices reasoned that third parties, including parents' could not
intrude on a woman's right to abortion in the first 12 weeks ofpregnancy. Similarly, if
parental consent is not needed in cases of abortion, then it should not be needed in
issues of contraception. Children, like adults, have the right to abortion and
contraception; therefore, it is logical to assume that children have procreation rights.
Grandparent Visitation Rights
Currently, all 50 states have grandparent visitation statutes, although these
statutes do not automatically giveallgrandparents legal standing to petition for
visitation. Three main approaches outlined in statutes that give grandparents' legal24
standing: derivatives, special circumstances, and open-ended laws (Hartfleld,1996;
McCrimmon & Howell,1989;Walther,1997).
Derivatives. The first statutes that allowed grandparents to petition for
visitation with their grandchildren were based on a derivative of rights theory
(Bostock, 1994; Gillman, 1995; Hartfleld, 1996; Walther, 1997). These statutes allow
grandparents to have access to their grandchildren when their own child does not have
access due to death, incompetence, unfitness, or incarceration. If the parent of the
child loses their parental rights as a result of divorce or some other form of
termination, then the grandparent loses all legal ties to their grandchild. Accordingto
BaIzib (1994), if a parent died, the related grandparent could petition for visitation
with his or her grandchild.
There are exceptions to these interpretations of derivative of rights. For
example, in one case, after the death of the biological father, the grandchild remained
in the custody of the mother who allowed visitation by the paternal grandparents(biie
the Matter of Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F., 1992; Michaels, 1993). These
visitations gradually decreased until the mother remarried and finally refused to allow
any visitation. Not long after the marriage, the stepfather began adoption proceedings.
The grandparents petitioned for visitation. The trial court held that visitationwas in
the child's best interest, but the grandparent right to visit would terminateupon an
adoption. After the adoption, the grandparents filed a petition opposing the condition
set by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals, relying heavily on another case, affirmed the trial
court's decision to terminate visitation rights upon the adoption. The Wisconsin25
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and concluded that the paternal
grandparents had a lawful right to visitation. In short, the father in C. G. F. (1992)
continued to hold his parental rights, even in death. Because the father continuedto
hold his parental rights, the grandparents' right to visitation via theirown child also
continued. Justices acted to promote the best interest of the grandchild by allowinga
continued relationship with the grandparents (Michaels, 1993).
Some derivative of right statutes, an exception, declare that visitation is only
allowedto grandparents whose own child is the noncustodial parent (Gillman, 1995;
Waither, 1997). This approach remains controversial because grandparents traditional
derive their rights through their own child, not the other parent. For example, the
Wyoming Supreme Court had to detennine whether the state's grandparent visitation
statute applied to custodial parents of both direct and indirect ancestry (BaizIb, 1994;
Goffv. Goff, 1993). In other words, the parents argued that grandparents shouldonly
derive their rights from their own biological áhild, the parent of the child, instead of
from the custodial parent who is not biologically related to the grandparent. This
argument failed to prevent the grandparents from obtaining visitation rights with their
grandchild.
Family disruption. Another set of statutes allows grandparents to petition for
visitation under varying special circumstances including the death ofa parent
(Bostock, 1994; Hartfield, 1996; Waither, 1997). Under special circumstances suchas
family disruption, justices may intrude on parental rights andgrant grandparent
visitation rights in order to protect the interests of children. These special
circumstances include (a) death of a parent, (b) declarationas an unfit parent, (c)26
completion of military duty, or (d) abandonment (Avin, 1994; BaIzib, 1994; Foster &
Freed, 1984; Hartfield, 1996; Shandling, 1986; Waither, 1997). Courts have been
more likely to provide grandparent visitation rights when family disruption has
occurred than when a fmi1y remains intact (Avin, 1994; BaIzib, 1994; Foster &
Freed, 1984; Hartfleld, 1996; Shandling, 1986; Waither, 1997).
Families experiencing disruption including divorce, death of parent,
abandonment, incarceration, or termination of parental rights may be more vulnerable
to poorer outcomes than families not experiencing family disruption (Demo, 1992;
McLanahan & Adams, 1987). According to the research, children's poor
developmental outcomes are not solely due to being raised in an intact versus a
nonintact fmiIy, but the fmily conflict associated with the circumstances (Amato,
1994; Demo, 1992). Consequently, the circumstances that surround decisions to
divorce, separation, or never marry influence the outcomes for children and families.
Researchers have found that children raised in families headed by single
mothers are atriskof poorer developmental outcomes and educational attainment.
These poorer outcomes correlated with the lower levels of supervision and parental
control. Children in single-parent homes who are economically deprived are
vulnerable of poorer developmental outcomes such low school attainment as well as
social and psychological strides (Amato, 1994; Demo, 1992). Poverty was found to
have the most adverse influence on children and families. According to an article by
Behrman and Quinn (1994), in 1991,justunder 40% of divorced mothers lived in
poverty and 55% of divorced mothers had children under the age of six.27
Looking at findings such as these, it is reasonable for justices to believe that
there is a compelling state interest to limit economic losses and disruptions in the
child's relationships (BaizIb, 1994; Bostock, 1994; Burns, 1991; Digest of Recent
Judicial Decisions, 1993; Jackson, 1994). The state may argue that it has a legitimate
interest in assuring that children have adequate supervision, guidance, and other
necessities. To protect children, the state may use its parens patriae or police power to
allow grandparent visitation when fniilies are not intact (BaIzib, 1994). As noted
earlier, parens patriae refers to the state's position as the "parent of the country" and
responsibility is to protect all citizens, especially those who are vulnerable. In
grandparent visitation cases, judges may invoke these powers to promote the interest
of dependent children.
Legal issues of dfferentia1 treatment offamilies. Some state statutes do not
allow grandparents to petition for visitation when families are intact. Some argue that
this means that legislators are treating parentsinintact families differently than
parents in nonintact families. Although differential treatment occurs, some justices do
not consider this discriminatory treatment (Ward v. Ward, 1987). Regardless of the
debate, American democracy requires equal treatment of its citizens. Legislation that
treats intact families differently from families that are not intact threatens the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution (Hartfield, 1996; Nicholson & Singerman, 1992;
Walther, 1997).
With the advent of grandparent visitation rights, grandparents are more likely
to obtain legal standing to petition for visitation with their grandchildren when the
family is not intact than when the family is intact (Walther, 1997). Once again, this28
differential treatment may be violating grandparents' Equal Protection Rights
(Hartfield,1996;Walther,1997).
Due process of law is another constitutional issue that arises in grandparent
visitation cases. Whenever the state intrudes on citizens' individual rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the state must afford the affected citizen due
process of law. Some parents argue that grandparent visitation statutes intrude upon
their liberty and privacy rights to imily relations and their right to raise their children.
Because these rights are fundamental, the state must have a compelling interest to
justifSr such an intrusion.
Grandparent visitation petitions will force states to define better the compelling
interest for intruding on parental rights. Thus fir, some have argued that the state has
an interest in providing children with stable relationships with grandparents.
Grandparent visitation rights are aimed at protecting children from the emotional harm
that comes with the ending of a grandparent-grandchild relationship. Otherspropose
that grandparents who sometimes act as the psychological parent to the child also
serve a state interest. Psychological parenting provides children with guidance and
support so that they can become self-sufficient citizens(HLR, 1980;Jackson,1994).
Children also benefit from having received additional role models through their
relationship with their grandparents (Balzlb,1994).
Some social scientists disagree and find that grandparents may do more harm
to grandchildren than good. According to the research, grandparents sometimes
undermine parental authority, create additional conflict, or have no influenceas a
direct result of issues of drug abuse by mothers or distant grandparenting (Aldous,29
1998; Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Thompson, Tinsley, Limber, Castrianno, 1991;
Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989).
Substantial relationship.Another special circumstance involves statutes based
on substantial relationships between the grandparent and grandchild. Some substantial
relationship statutes refer to residency with grandparents as a substantial relationship
(Bostock, 1994). Generally, there is little clarity or consistency in the language of state
statutes about what constitutes a substantial relationship. Some state statutes are broad
stating simply a grandparent-grandchild relationship. Other statutesare more
distinctive, using the language of substantial relationship. Consequently, statutes based
on a substantial relationship have the potential to extend grandparent visitation rights
beyond family disruption (Balzlb, 1994; Bostock, 1994; Walther, 1997). These
statutes allow the state to intrude upon the rights of fit parents within intact families.
In substantial relationship statutes, justices are attempting to promote and protect the
child's best interest by maintaining grandparent-grandchild relationships (Balzlb,
1994; BohI, 1996; Jackson, 1994).
Some justices have connoted substantial relationships as residency witha
grandparent. Referring back Goffv. Goff (1993), a case in Wyoming that involveda
derivative of right statute, the custodial parents had a second challenge to the visitation
schedule outlined by the trial court. The custodial parents challenged that the trial
court abused its discretionary powers by intruding on their parental rights and ignoring
the best interest of the child standard. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reasoned that
the trial court did not act outside its discretion and the burden of proofwas on the
custodial parents. Because the custodial parents previously allowed grandparents to30
visit with their grandchild, the trial court simply structured a visitation agreement
among the two parties (BaIzib, 1994; Goffv. Goff, 1993).
Based on the Wyoming statute, grandparents may petition for visitation if the
grandchild lived with them for any six consecutive months. Justices also noted that if
parents allowed their child to spend six consecutive months with their grandparents,
then the parents relinquished some of their parental rights. Because the children lived
with the grandparents for four years and had an extended visitation of six months with
the grandparents, then the grandparents were entitled to visitation rights.
Open-ended statutes based on the best interest of the child. The advent of
grandparent visitation statutes suggests that the public's belief that grandparents havea
legal and moral right to visitation has caused legislators to respond accordingly. Some
grandparent visitation statutes, also referred to as open-ended statutes, do not require
the conditions of fmily disruption or derivative rights theory to grant visitation (BohI,
1996; Bostock, 1994; Jackson, 1994). Open-ended statutes allow grandparents to file
petitions against fit, intact fmilies for visitation with grandchildren despite parental
objections (Bohl, 1996). Some amendments expanded grandparents' rights by:
broadening courts' authority to grant grandparent visitation,
allowing adoptive grandparents to maintain visitation after the parents
divorce,
permitting mediation in grandparent visitation cases,
removing grandparent visitation rights from adoption laws, and
assuming that biological parents do not always know what is in the best
interest of the child.31
In response to more recent open-ended statutes, justices have also awarded
visitation to serve the child's best interests (Bohl, 1996; Bostock, 1994; Foster &
Freed, 1984; Hartfleld, 1996; King v. King. 1992; Klyman, 1994). The best
interest of the child has been interpreted as grandparents' deepconcern for or
significant relationship with the grandchild (King v. King, 1992) and
grandparents' economic support of their grandchild (Bostock, 1994; Burns, 1991;
Estate of Topel. 1966; In re Emanuel S v. Joseph E, 1991; In the Matter of the
Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F., 1992; Jackson, 1994; Kingv. King, 1992;
Lehrer v. Davis, 1990; Spradling v. Harris, 1989). Others argued that parental
unfitness or child endangerment, including child maltreatment,are the only
circumstances that justify state intrusion on parental rights. Protectinga child in
these two circumstances promotes the child's best interest (Bohi, 1996).
Another group of open-ended statutes allows justices to grant visitation
with a child to any person if the justice finds such visitationserves the child's best
interest (BohI, 1996: Klyman, 1994; Walther, 1997). Several states have amended
their grandparent visitation statutes to include great-grandparents (Jackson, 1994).
According to BohI (1996), King v. King (1992) and .Hawk v. Hawk
(1993) exemplify the issues surrounding open-ended statutes. Referring back
to King v. King (1992), the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that grandparent
visitation was in the child's best interest. These were the facts: Stewart and
Ann King lived on a farm owned by Stewart's father. Beforeafamilydispute,
the grandfather enjoyed daily contact with his grandchild. After they moved,32
Stewart and Ann discontinued the visits between the grandfather and
grandchild; the grandfather petitioned for visitation.
The parents argued that grandparent visitation under the Kentucky
statute violated their parental rights. The Supreme Court of Kentucky heard
this case in order to decide whether the trial court's decision, which granted
grandparent visitation to serve the child's best interest, violated the parents'
constitutional rights. This court reasoned that disputes among adults should not
disrupt the grandparent-grandchild relationship. The court also believed that
the continuation of a loving relationship was in the child's best interest.
Furthermore, the justices believed that the grandparent-grandchild relationship
benefited both parties. For instance, grandchildren are exposed to the insights
of grandparents and grandparents are spared loneliness and isolation. The
statute also served to protect the child's rights by using the best interest of the
child standard to maintain a substantial intergenerational tie.
The father, Stewart King, admitted that his father loved, nurtured, and
provided a safe place for the child. Both the grandfather and the son agreed
that a substantial relationship existed between the grandchild and grandfather.
This decision also focused on the substantial relationship and the best interest
of the child.
Referring once more to Hawk v. Hawk (1993), paternal grandparents sought
visitation of their grandchildren under the Grandparent Visitation Act of Tennessee.
The lower courts granted the visitation resulting in the parents filing an appeal. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee denied the grandparents' request for visitation because33
the child was not threatened by economic deprivation and the parentswere fit. As
stated by the court, "The lower court's interference into a decision of admittedly good
parents was an unprecedented intrusion into a protected sphere of family life" (Hawk
v. Hawk, 1993,p. 577).
As shown by these two cases, open-ended statutes do not always lead to
grandparents being awarded visitation with their grandchildren. State intrusion
into parental rights create tensions in fmily law.
Summary. Grandparents may obtain legal standing to visit their
grandchildren by way of statutes that take three different approaches. Derivatives
are statutes allowing grandparents access to grandchildren when their own child
does not have access due to death, incompetence, unfitness, or incarceration
(Bostock, 1994). Family disruption including death of a parentor the loss of
parental rights due termination of parental rights, military duty, or abandonment is
a special circumstance that also affords grandparent some legal standing to
petition for visitation. Equal protection and due process of the laware legal
concerns when parents are treated differently in intact versus nonintact fmilies.
Grandparents may also obtain legal standing to petition for visitation if they have
a substantial relationship with their grandchild or if their grandchild resided with
them. A final approach to legal standing by grandparents petitioning for visitation
rights is open-ended statutes based on the best interest of the child. Thesestatutes
state that the best interest of the child is served if grandparents have a deep
concern for or significant relationship with grandchildren or if grandparents
provide economic support to their grandchildren. Grandparent visitation rights,34
unlike parental rights, are not constitutional constructions protected by landmark
decisions and common law. These rights are statutory in nature, leaving
grandparents legally vulnerable.
Criticism of the Best Interest of the Child Standard
Because the best interest of the child is so predominant in grandparent
visitation right cases, it is important to outline some of the criticisms associated with
this standard. The strongest criticism of the best interest of the child standard arises
because justices are intruding on the individual rights of parentsthe right to fmily
and to raise their child as they see fit (Balzlb, 1994; Bostock, 1994; Pumell & Bagby,
1993; Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989).
This criticism, unlike the earlier discussion on grandparents' influence on
families, addresses the, less positive influences of grandparents on families. Family
research indicates that grandparent-grandchild relationships may sometimes have
adverse influences on a child by undermining parental authority and religious precepts
(Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989). Children may also experience
psychological stress due to split loyalties between parents and grandparents. Others
are concerned that childrenwillbe placed at the center of conflicts between parents
and a grandparent, resulting in additional psychological stress that undermines the
child's best interest (Bostock, 1994; Jackson, 1994; Purnell & Bagby, 1993;
Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989). For instance, Thompson and his
colleagues (1994) argued that justices tend to grant visitation rights to grandparents
under exceptional circumstances of family disruption. Despite attempts toargue that35
grandparental visitation promotes the best interest of the child, justices do not make
any provisions for the formation of a new family.
A second criticism is that the best interest of the child standard allows justices
to use their discretion in exceptional circumstances of family disruptions (Avin, 1994;
BaIzib, 1994; Shandling, 1986). Grandparents may have legal standing, but justices
determine if this visitation is in the child's best interest. Justices may interpret the best
interest of the child as a response to the child's wishes or theymay consider the
mental and physical health of the involved parties. Justices also may determine that
the best interest of the child warrants an examination of the personal relationship of
the child to his or her siblings, parents, and significant others (Hlntz, 1994; Indermark,
1992; Klyman, 1994). Justices may also consider (a) parents' desires; (b) child's
adjustment to the home, school, and community environments; and (c) maintenance of
relationships with a primary caregiver (Indermark, 1992).
Because visitation cases use different legal standards from custody cases,
justices have discretion in grandparent visitation cases (Avin, 1994; Bohi, 1996).
Open-ended statutes based on the best interest of the child standard provide justices
with greater discretion in visitation cases than in custody cases.
For example, in one case the biological parents of the grandchildren divorced
and shared joint custody. Both the paternal and maternal grandparents had substantial
relationships with the grandchildren that included frequent visits and attendance at
grandchildren's extracurricular activities. Although the maternal grandparentssaw the
children every other Sunday at gatherings of family and friends, they fileda petition
against the biological father for visitation rights. The grandparents believed that the36
biological father was not giving them sufficient time with their grandchildren. Despite
a lack of family disruption or threat of harm to the child, justices determined that
grandparent visitation was not dependent upon the parental rights, but restedon the
best interest of the child standard. It is important to highlight that the grandparents
already had access to their grandchildren, but the justices held that the grandparents
had "an independent right to petition for visitation with their grandchildren"
(Fairbanks et ux. v. McCarter, 1993,p. 5).
A third criticism arises because there remains no clear definition of best
interest of the child standard as it relates to grandparent visitation petitions (Baizib,
1994; BohI, 1996; Harifield, 1996; Indermark, 1992; Jackson, 1994). Some statutes
narrowly define the best interest of the child to include maintenance of stable
relationships when family disruption exists (Shandling, 1986). A few statutes give
some guidance toward the meaning thebestinterest of the child standard. The most
definitive connotations of the best interest of the child standardare when a parent
neglects, physically abuses, or deprives a child of necessities (BaizIb, 1994; BohI,
1996).
The last major criticism is that the best interest of the child standard varies
from state to state (Jackson, 1994). The lack of definitional consistencyacross states
warrants the development of a uniform federal law that incorporates a more clearly
defined best interest of the child standard. Without a uniform federal law,
grandparents and parents may be treated differently although theymay be similarly
situated. Without a uniform federal law, parents maymove from one state with a
stronger grandparent visitation statute to another state with a less defined statute. A37
uniform federal law might reduce unequal treatment of grandparents andprevent
parents from relocating to avoid adhering to court mandates that allow grandparents
visitation with their grandchildren. Likewise, a uniform lawmay serve to prevent
grandparent abuse of powers when good parents, not perfect parents,are establishing
their own family traditions and rules. Although theseare contradictory goals, this
uniform law needs also to be flexible, allowing for case-by-case decision-making
(Jackson, 1994; Walther, 1997).
To address some of these criticisms, one legal scholar developeda
comprehensive guideline for the best interest of the child standard. BaizIb (1994)
suggested these guidelines be amended to the Wyoming Statute (a) to determine if
grandparent visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship, (b) to find out
if a natural and prior relationship existed between the grandparent and grandchild, and
(c) to examine the relationship between the grandparent and parents of the grandchild.
Additionally, Balzlb (1994) suggested that the amendment reviewsome specific issues
related to the grandparents' capacity to love and guide the grandchild along with the
character of the grandparents including moral fitness. The final portion of the
amendment should take into consideration the preferences of the child and the
recommendations of impartial third parties.
BaizIb's (1994) guidelines are comprehensive, allowing for the protection of
parents' constitutional rights, the grandparent-grandchild relationship, and the parent-
grandparent relationship. In addition, these guidelines answersome of the legal
concerns of scholars. For instance, these guidelines require that individuals who have38
access to a child share a legal obligation for the care and economic support of the child
(Bostock, 1994; Hintz, 1994).
Summary. The best interest of the child standard has led tosome justices
allowing state intrusion on the highly guarded rights of parents. Basedon the research
reviewed for this study, justices were likely to grant grandparents' visitation with their
grandchild if there was form of family disruption or if said visitationwas thought to be
in the child's best interest. Social scientists opposed to grandparent visitation rights
argue that the child's best interest is not served when parental autonomy is
undermined, family conflict arises, and children are placed in the middle of
disagreements between parents and grandparents (Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, &
Parke, 1989).
Other criticisms of this standard include the fact that justices are given greater
discretion in visitation versus custody cases, thereby, allowinga increased likelihood
of intruding on parental rights. Still yet, there is no clear definition of what constitutes
the child's best interest and definition vary from state to state. Balzlb (1994)
developed a comprehensive guideline that including examining relationshipsamong
the parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, and grandparent-parent. The ambiguity of
this standard provides social scientists with the challenge of continued research
(Purnell & Bagby, 1993) and justices with balancing the rights of parents, children,
and grandparents (King v. King, 1992).39
Summary
Grandparenthood has become an important familial change for social scientists
and legal scholars. Changes in fertility, longevity, and family disruption have
contributed to the contómporaiy grandparenthood. At the same time, as the population
of older people has grown, so have their political powers. Grandparent visitation rights
statutes were enacted in 50 states. Courts are being called upon to interpret these
statutes and to balance state interests against the individual rights of parents, children,
and grandparents. Grandparent visitation cases have move the pendulum from a
tradition in family law that seeks to balance the rights of parents and children that
sometimes compete against state interests.
Looking atsocialscience research, the results are varied. In some instances,
grandparents provide economic and social support to grandchildren and their own
child. On the other hand, grandparents may have more adverse consequences to the
parent-child relationship and to family functioning by creating greater stress within
homes.
The legal research similarly has varying results. Despite this tradition that
protected parental autonomy, grandparent visitation statutes have arisen in three basic
forms: derivatives, special circumstances of fimily disruption, and best interest of the
child. Grandparents obtain access to their grandchild through their own child unless
their own child, the parent of the child, loses their parental rights. The usually occurs
when a parent dies and the grandparents of the dead parent areallowedvisitation.
With family disruption such as divorce, some visitation statutes provide the child with
the prospect of additional social and tangible support from grandparents. Some40
grandparent visitation statutes allow grandparent visitation when the said visitation is
thought to be in the best interest of the child, even if the parent objects. Each of these
statutory approaches intrudes on parental rights at different levels. Derivatives of right
statutes are less intrusive than the other two, with the best interest of the child statutes
being the most intrusive. Grandparents appear to have a greater chance at obtain
visitation with their grandchild with the later approach, the othersare highly
dependent upon the rights and status of parents.
Because the best interest of the child standard is interpreted from a tradition of
threat of harm to a child and unfit parents to substantial grandparent-grandchild
relationship, it has received great criticism. The variation in research and legal
scholarship failed to help courts to better define this standard. These variations
coupled with many unasked or unanswered questions warrant the involvement of
social scientists in the legal system. There is a growing need for social scientists to
critically analyze legal materials and the influence ofjustices, attorneys, and others
involved parties on families (Tanke & Tanke, 1979; WaIters, 1983).
The current study seeks to better understand the court interpretation of all three
statutory approaches and the relation of these statutes to the best interest of the child
standard. This study serves also to inform social scientists of some of the pertinent
issues of grandparent visitation rights. To do so, court opinions were analyzed to
determine how grandparents derived legal standing. Additional analyses examined the
legal reasoning for granting or denying visitation rights.41
CHAPTER THREE
Methods
The current study used content analysis to examine court opinionson
grandparent visitation rights. Content analysis is a systematic examination of
documents, books, stories, language, videotapes, and more (Berg, 1995). Substantive
meanings are gathered from categories, subcategories, and themes extracted from the
data. In addition, grounded theory also was employed. Grounded theory isa method
that allow researchers to extract substantial meaning and formal theory directly from
the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). These methods were used to conducta systematic
analysis of issues related to grandparents' petitioning for visitation with their
grandchildren.
Research Ouestions
There were two main research questions: (1) On what baseswere grandparents
granted legal standing to petition for visitation with their grandchildren? (2) Whatwas
the legal reasoning for granting or denying visitation rights?
Procedures
Using LEXIS NEXIS Electronic Database, a national collection of legal
articles, court opinions, and other legal resources, several stepswere taken to extract42
court opinions. The list below includes steps taken to extract data using specific
domains and exact language of LEXIS NEXIS:
1.Located "State Legal Research" section of the database
2. Moved to "Case Law State" section of the database
3.Selected and searched one state at a time
4.Searched each state's records using these specific domains:
(a) "grandparents and visitation,"
(b) higher to lower courts,
(c) 01/01/86 to 11/30/98.
5. Reviewed holding and summary of opinion when given.
If there were no state Supreme or Superior Court opinions, then the search was
extended to the state Appellate Courts or to lower District or Family Courts. This was
done for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia had no
recorded grandparent visitation cases.
To improve the accuracy of the search, a second search was completed using
"grandparen! and visitatio!" as the key words along with all the above outlined steps.
This technique was recommended by LEXIS NEXIS help option and was used to
narrow the search.
There were two important reasons for using selecting cases from the higher
court. First, it is important to identifS' which court heard grandparent right petitions.
The highest court, beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court and followed by state
supreme courts set precedence on legal issues. Cases heard in state appellate courts set
precedence for cases heard in family or district courts. Second, this approach allowed43
the researcher to determine where parental rights and grandparent visitation rights
stand in the United States. Consequently, a basic data set (N = 189) was extracted
from LEXIS NEXIS for 50 states (See Appendix A).
Data Analysis
The data analysis involved determining what cases to review and how to code
the data. As noted in the review of literature, beginning in 1986, the first grandparent
visitation statutes were enacted. Thus, the sample was drawn from opinions occurring
from January 1, 1986 to November 30, 1998. No United States Supreme Court
decisions were found that dealt with grandparent visitation rights; therefore, the
sample for this study has only state level court opinions.
To determine the final sample, two tiers of case elimination occurred. After
skimming the conclusions and summary where given, 50 cases were eliminated from
the sample of 189 because they did not deal directly with grandparent visitation rights.
Some cases dealt with custody issues and merely mentioned grandparent visitation
rights. Venue, child support, and fees were the primary focus of many these cases (See
Appendix B).
A second reading was also conducted to identif' the actual study cases. This
second reading revealed that another 36 cases had been remanded back to the trial
court for further proceedings (See Appendix C). Remanded cases were not analyzed
because they did not contain information pertinent to the research questions.
The remaining 103 cases were reread to determine whether grandparents were
granted legal standing to petition for visitation with their grandchildren, the first44
research question. The first major category comprised grandparents who failedto
obtain legal standing. Accordingly, the second major category included grandparents
who obtained legal standing (See Figure 1).
Based on the literature reviewed for this case, grandparents would obtain legal
standing based on three statutory approaches: derivatives, special circumstances of
family disruption, or best interest of the child. Consequently, under theno legal
standing or legal standing categories, the researcher expectedsome court reasoning to
include some aspect of these statutory approaches (See Figure 1).
The category of obtained legal standing required additional coding. Three sub-
categories were constructed for grandparents who were (a) denied visitation with their
grandchild, (b) granted visitation with their grandchild, and (c) involved in related
legal issues that had to be decided before the courts could determine if the
grandparents should be awarded visitation with their grandchild. Althoughpast
research guided the research questions, these additional categorieswere derived
directly from the data.
After defining these categories, the researcher coded the pertinentparts of the
court opinions. The themes were influenced by the literature but derived from the data.
For each case, a theme or category was identified on the side of relevant paragraphs.
For the No Legal Standing Category the themes includedno action pending,
jurisdiction, permissive intervention, family disruption, derivatives, and best interest
of the child. For each of the three sub-categories, additional thematictrees were
derived from the data. For instance, under the sub-category of Denied Visitation
Rights, the themes of no action pending, jurisdiction, derivatives, family disruption,45
intrude upon parental rights, and best interest of the child emerged from thedata.
These themes were later recoded under three major headings of statutory
requirements, intruding upon parental rights, and best interest of the child (See Figure
2).
Figure 1Decision Tree for Coding Grandparent Visitation Cases
Grandparent Visitation Rights
No Legal Standing
I fLegal Standing
Denied Visitation Rights
I
Parental rights
No action pending
Jurisdiction
Permissive intervention Granted Visitation Rights
Family disruption
Derivatives
Best interest of the child
I Other Issues I
These categories or themes were typed or scanned entered intoa Word file and
saved as a MS-DOS Text with Breaks. Later, these datawere imported into WINMAX
under the two major categories of No Legal Standingor Legal Standing, and the four
sub-categories of Denied Visitation Rights, Granted Visitation Rights, and Other
Issues. WINMAX QualitativeDataAnalysis program was used to code or recode data.
After the coding was complete, the coded data filewas exported into Word with each
category and theme being reviewed. Edits were made and the recoded datawas46
exported into Word. The final results were analyzed by reviewing all trees and codes.
The researcher attempted to find appropriate examples from the data to support each
identified category, sub-category, and theme.
Figure 2 Decision Tree for Legal Standing, Denied Visitation Rights
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Sampling Strategy
The sample was drawn from state supreme, appellant, and trial courts with the
goal of examining the legal reasoning being used for grandparent visitation right cases.
To clarify the logic surrounding this sampling method requires an explanation of the
United States court system. This country's government is based on the principles of
separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial, as well as the
principle of federalism, a separation of federal and state governments. The judicial
system utilizes both of these principles (Straayer & Wrinlde, 1975).
National court system. The U.S. Supreme Court, constructed by the
Constitution, has the ultimate judicial powers in this country. Although few cases
make it to this court, the cases heard set the precedence for the nation, meaning
establishes the laws and guidelines for all other inferior courts in the federal and state
systems (Straayer & Wrinkle, 1975).
Congress has created inferior courts including the federal courts of appeals,
district, and a few special courts. The federal courts of appeals are just above the
district or trial courts and hear cases on appeal only. District and trial courts hear the
case first, legally this court has original jurisdiction. These special courts include U. S.
Court of Claims, U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, U.S. Customs Court, and
more (Straayer & Wrinkle, 1975).
State court system. All states have a court system that encompasses some
combination of state supreme, major trial, and lower courts. State supreme courts hear
cases on appeal and, like the U. S. Supreme Court, determine controversial cases that
hinge on some constitutionality question. When state supreme courts render a48
decision, that decision becomes the precedence and law for the lower courts to follow.
These courts are pivotal in establishing law since all lower courts most follow their
decisions. The only exception is when these decision conflict with U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. State supreme courts have grave implications for a "large number of
people" (Straayer & Wrinkle,p. 121, 1975).
Most states have an immediate appellant court which have jurisdiction over
lower courts, but their authority is beneath that of state supreme courts. These courts
not only hear cases on appeal, but serve to reduce the case loads of state supreme
courts (Straayer & Wrinkle, 1975).
Trial and lower courts including juvenile justice or family courts also hear the
majority of cases and have original jurisdiction. Below the trial courts are county,
municipal, or justice of the peace courts. These courts may hear cases involving traffic
violations, small claims, and misdemeanors. The names and roles of the courts may
vary, but the general concept mimics that of the national courts system with
hierarchical system (Straayer & Wrinlde, 1975).
The courts and the current study. Of the 103 cases selected for the study, 61%
( = 63) were heard in state supreme or superior courts, 29% (ii = 30) in appellant
courts, and 1O% (ii = 10) at the family or district courts (See Table 1).
Grandparents in 71 of the 103 cases (69%) obtained legal standing and 32
(31%) did not obtain legal standing. In cases in which grandparents did not obtain
legal standing, 59%(a.=19) were heard in state supreme courts, 25% (ii =8) in
appellant courts, and 16% (ii =5) in the family court level (See Table 1).
Of the total sample, 34% (ii = 35) were granted legal standing, but denied
visitations rights. Of these 35 cases, 60% (ii = 21) were heard in state supreme courts,49
34% of cases (ii = 12) were heard in appellant courts, and 6%(n..=2) in lower courts
such as family court.
Of the grandparents who received legal standing, 30% (j =31)were granted
visitation rights with their grandchild. Approximately 61% (ii= 19) of grandparents
who were granted visitation rights were heard at the statesupreme court level, 29%Ln
=9) were heard at the appellant court level, and 10%(n=3) at family or district court
levels.
Another 5 cases did not deal with denying legal standingor granting or
denying grandparent visitation rights, but rather issues that needed to be decided
before legal standing or court ordered visitation decisions could be made.
Additionally, these cases signified situations in which grandparentswere not only
given legal standing, but were able to use varying legal issues to seta path toward
court-ordered visitation. These related issues were constitutionality of statutes, motion
to consolidate proceeding, and a writ of prohibition. Four of the five cases were heard
at the supreme court level and one at the appellant court level.
Regardless of the outcome, 59% to 80% of grandparent visitationcases
examined in the current study were heard at the statesupreme court level. This is an
important accomplishment by older adults because statesupreme courts establish the
legal precedence for each state. Furthermore, for cases to advance to the U.S. Supreme
Court, they usually must first reach state supreme courts.50
Table I - Number of Cases Heard at Each Court Level and the General Outcome
Court SupremeAppellantTrial or
Family
Total
Denied Legal Standing 19 8 5 32
(59%) (25%) (16%)(3 1%)
Legal Standing, Denied 21 12 2 35
Visitation (60%) (34%) (6%)(34%)
Legal Standing, Granted 19 9 3 31
Visitation (61%) (29%) (1 0%)(30%)
Legal Standing, Other Issues 4 1 0 5
(80%) (20%) (5%)
Total 63 30 10 103
Courts of appeal hold the second tier of authority in terms of setting
precedents. Another 20% to 34% of grandparent visitationcases were heard at this
level. Taken together, grandparents have successfiully voiced their rightto visitation
and family associations by getting the higher courts within states to attendto their
political needs or to hear their petitions.
Seven out of the ten cases heard at the district, family,or juvenile court level
resulted in grandparents being denied legal standingor visitation rights. This is an
important point because justices at the higher court levels tendto adhere to lower court
decisions unless there has been an abuse ofjudicial discretion.51
CHAPTER FOUR
Results: Grandparents Who Did Not Obtain Legal Standing
In 32 cases (31%), grandparents failed to receive legal standing (See Appendix
D). There were three primary justifications used by judges to deny legal standing: (a)
grandparent visitation unfairly intruded upon the fundamental rights of parents, (b)
grandparents failed to meet the requirements of grandparent visitation statutes, and (c)
grandparent visitation was not in the best interest of the child (See Table 2).
Table 2 Justifications for Denying Grandparents Legal Standing
Justification nPercentage
Intrude on parental rights4 13
Statutory requirements 26 81
Best interest of the child 2 6
Total 32 100
Grandparent Visitation Unfairly Intruded on the Fundamental Rights of Parents
In 13% (ij4) of the cases, grandparents were denied legal standing, based on
the rationale that grandparents would intrude on the fundamental rights of parents.
Justices who denied grandparents' legal standing didso in favor of parental rights and
because parents are to determine what is best for their child (Brooks et al.v.52
Parkerson. 1995; In re Schmidt. 1986; McMainv. Iowa Court of Polk County, 1997;
Murray v. Marks, 1993). Themes attached to protecting parents from the unfair
intrusion of grandparent visitation rightswere (a) parental rights are paramount, and
(b) the compelling state interests. These themes support traditions in family law that
protect the fundamental rights of parents who are married with children. The following
quotation illustrates the attitude of justices in these decisions:
As important as grandparents can be in the lives of their grandchildren,
the relationship between parent and child is paramount. For thisreason,
I can not believe in either the constitutionally or the political
correctness of any law that allows a court, using its own notions of
what 'special circumstances' are, to pierce the delicate, complex and
sacred unity of parent and child against the wishes of fit parents and
without a showing of absolute necessity. While I haveno quarrel with
governmental interference where a parent's conduct may injurea child
emotionally or physically, interference on less than those grounds is
contrary to our common law tradition of protecting the nuclear family
as the foundation of society and leaving fit parents the exclusive right
to determine what is in their children's best interest. Far from being
outmoded, that tradition is critical today. In this indifferent, lackluster
and frightened time, we need to prote(t the sanctity and shoreup the
security provided by our families more than atany other time I can
think of child. (Brooks et al.. v. Parkerson, 1995, p.6)
Parental rights are paramount. Justices denied grandparents legal standing
because parentalrightsare fundamental and highly guarded. As explained in the
review of literature, historically, parents have had the right to raise their children
without unwarranted government intrusion. According tosome justices, grandparent
visitation rights are undermining familial and parental autonomy.
Protections afforded parents are found in landmarkcases and common law. In
Brooks et al.. v. Parkerson (1995) and In the Matter of the Application of Christopher
Steven Herbst (1998), justices mentioned the landmark family lawcases that set53
precedents for protecting parental rights (Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923; Piercev. Society
of Sisters, 1925). Other justices referred to their state statutes that, like these landmark
decisions, protected parental rights (R..T. and M. 1. v. J. E.. 1994; Mclntryev.
Mclntrye, 1995).
Even though grandparents have more rights now than in the past, parental
rights supercede grandparent rights because parental rightsare protected under
common law and grandparent rights are purely statutory. Common law refers to legal
protections outside of pure legislative enactments, such as grandparent visitation
statutes. This hierarchy of rights place parentalrightsin the utmost position of power
and protection:
We begin with the common law background against which the
visitation statutes were enacted. At common law, grandparents,or third
parties in general, have had no right to visitation. Rather, the decision
as to who may or may not have access to a minor child has been
deemed an issue of parental prerogative. M. Quintal, "Court-Ordered
Families: An Overview of Grandparent Visitation Statutes," 29 Suffolk
U. L. Rev. 835 (1995); ....The common law reflects the belief that the
family unit should be respected, anditsautonomy and privacy invaded
through court action only in the most pressing circumstances. That right
of the parents to determine the care, custody, and control of their
children is recognized because it reflects a strong tradition foundedon
the history and culture of Western civilization, and because it reflectsa
strong tradition founded on the history and culture of Western
civilization, and because the parental role is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition. (Castagno et alv. Wholean
1996, p. 3)
Based on this ideology, the judge deemed that parental rights superceded
grandparental rights and state interest in sustaining intergenerational ties.
In other words, the parents' thndamental liberty interest in raising their
children in accordance with their own views is paramount to the54
grandparents liberty interest in familial relationship may well come
within the definition of the family, this right to visit relationship takes
second place to the hierarchy of parent-child. (Murrv v. Marks, 1993,p.
4)
Intact families, married parents and children, received greater legal protection than
grandparents. Although Moore v. the City of East Cleveland (1977) provided
grandparents with some constitutional protection, the courts have not advanced the
rights of citizens within intergenerational families.
Compelling state interest. What intrusions are permissible? The state or
government may intrude upon parents' fundamental rights if there is a compelling
state interest exist. Among the cases in which grandparents failed to receive legal
standing, justices did not view grandparent visitation rights or the maintenance of
intergenerational ties as a compelling state interest (Brooks et aL. v. Parkerson, 1995;
In the Matter of the Application of Christopher Steven Herbest. 1998; R. T. and M. T.
v. J. E. and L. E., 1994).
Justices failed to give grandparents legal standing by relying on landmark
cases that outlined what constituted permissible government intrusion such as child
labor laws, compulsory education laws, and vaccinations (e.g., Brooks et aL v.
arkerson, 1995; In the Matter of the Application of Christopher Steven Herbst, 1998).
A legitimate compelling state interest was interpreted as being an unfit parentor
potential threat of harm to the child. Without these two circumstances parental rights
were continue to supercede grandparent visitation rights:
The facts of this case involve no harm or threat of harm to S.D.S. and
no unfitness on the part of the parents. As a result, there is no interest
so compelling which could give the State of Oklahoma license to55
interfere with the decision of these parents whose care for their child
has never been questioned or suspect. Herbst argues foran application
of 10 O.S. Section 5 (AX 1) which effectively strips parents of the right
to make the decisions regarding grandparental visitation and their own
children. Any conflict between the fundamental, constitutional right of
parents to care fortheir children as they see fit and the statutorily
created right of grandparental visitation must be reconciled in favor of
the preservation of the parents' constitutional rights. The relationship
between parent and child must be held paramount. (In The Matter of
The Application of Christopher Steven Herbst. Christopher Steven,
1998, pp. 5-6)
Generally, justices were willing to intrude upon parental rights whena
compelling state interest existed such as threat of harm to the childor unfit parents.
Additionally, permissible government intrusion required a showing that the child
would be harmed by not having access to his or her grandparents. A desirable
grandparent-grandchild relationship is notlegallysufficient:
However, even assuming grandparent visitation promotes the health
and welfare of the child, the state may only impose that visitationover
the parents' objections on a showing that failing to do so would be
harmful to the child. It is irrelevant, to this constitutional analysis, that
it might, in many instances be "better" or "desirable" fora child to
maintain contact with a grandparent. The statute in question is
unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions because
it does not clearly promote the health or welfare of the child and does
not require a showing of harm before state interference is authorized.
For the above and foregoing reason, the trial court's denial of the
parents' motion to dismiss is reversed. (Brooks et al. v. Parkerson,
1995,p.5)
Grandparents Failed to Meet Statutory Requirements
Grandparents were denied legal standing in approximately 81% (p= 26) of cases
because statutory requirements were not met (B. R. 0. v.0. C. 0., 1994; Castegnoet56
aL v. Tina Wholean et al., 1996; Delia S. et aL.v. Claymont, 1997; Enos v. Correia,
Higginbotham. 1995; In the Interest of J. W. W., 1997; In the Matter of the Adoption
of Minor Identified in the Petition, 1990; In the Matter of the Adoption of G. D. L.,
1987; In re Gibson, 1991; In re the Marriage of Bridgette Lachae' Morris. 1986;Iar
the Visitation of Troxel, 1997; Kasperv. Nordfelt, 1991; Little v. Little, 1996; Linda
K v. Alex A Jr., 1998; Mclntrye v. Mclntrye, 1995; O'Brienv. O'Brien, 1996; Olson
v. Flinn, 1986; Puleo v. ForgueataL, 1993; Rivers v. Gadwah, 1996; Ruth I. J. &
Shirley A. K. v. James R. M., 1993; Sowers v. Tsamolias, 1997; Sposatov. Sposato,
1997; State ex rd Costello v. Honorable F. G. Cottrell, 1994; Susterv. Arkansas
Department of Human Services, 1993; Vice v. Andrews, 1997). This justification
translated into themes of(a) no action pending and dismissals (b) jurisdiction, (c)
permissive intervention, (d) derivatives, and (e) special circumstances of family
disruption.
No action pending and dismissals. One statutory requirement involveda pending
action. Because grandparent visitation rightswere constructed by legislative
enactments and not by common law, grandparents were required to meet statutory
requirements necessary for legal standing includinga pending action. When an action
was deemed moot or no action was pending justices denied grandparents legal
standing (B. B.. 0. v. G. C. 0., 1994; Higginbotham and Higginbotbamv.
Higginbotham, 1991; In re the Visitation of Troxel. 1997; Littlev. Little, 1996; Ruth I.
J. and Shirley A. K. v. James B.. M., 1993; Sposatov. Sposato, 1997). For example:
The issue Robin has raised is moot. This isan appeal from an order
granting grandparent visitation for a specific time period that has57
expired. Robin appealed the visitation order nearly two months after the
period for visitation had passed. The issue was deemed moot because
the order expired before the appeal, no 'actual controversy' existed.
(Sposato v. Sposato, 1997,p. 3)
In B.R.O v G.C.O. (1994), judges noted that no divorceor visitation proceeding
existed that would allow the grandmother to petition for visitation with their
grandchild; thereby, the grandmother failed to meet the requirements of the
grandparent visitation statute.
Under the theme of no action pending, some cases resulted in dismissals because
(a) the grandparents' legal ties were severed once the childwas adopted, (b) proper
adherence of the best interest of the child standard, and (c) the court upheld the lower
courts' decision that denied grandparents visitation rights (David J. & Rita K.v.
Theresa K. & Lora Lane, 1993; In the Interest ofJ. W. W., 1997; Puelov. Forgue et
.,1993). Grandparent visitation rights were dependent on the strict adherence of
relevant laws including grandparent visitation and adoption statutes.
Jurisdiction. Another statutory justification for grandparents not receiving legal
standing was a lack of jurisdiction (Delia S.etal.. v. Claymont, 1997; In re Gibson,
1991; Linda K v. Alex A. Jr., 1998). For example, in Linda K.v. Alex A. Jr., (1998),
grandparents filed a petition in Louisiana when their grandchildwas a legal resident in
Delaware. Thus, justices dismissed the case because they did not have jurisdiction
over this matter.
Permission to intervene. Grandparents were also denied legal standing because
they lacked permission to intervene (In Re Schmidt et at 1986; In the Matter of the
Adoption of Minor Identified in the Petition, 1990). Grandparentswere denied legal58
standing because they were not parties to custody or adoption proceedingsor they did
not have a statutoly right to intervene:
We find that the juvenile court did not err in its application of R..C.
3109.28 when it rejected the Smiths' motion to intervene. There were
no allegations or evidence set forth in the Smiths' motion to intervene
that would reasonably indicate that the Smiths had a right to custody of;
or visitation with, their grandson. While persons "claiming a right" to
custody or visitation must be joined as parties to custody proceedings,
any such claim must be colorable. The record in this case reveals only
that the Smiths had a "desire" for custody or visitation. Theynever
sought temporaiy or permanent custody of Robert, Jr., and their
visitation with Robert Jr. had occurred, with the consent of the welfare
department, only during Donna Smith's once monthly visits with her
children. In summation, the Smiths never obtained, through statute,
court order, or other means, any legal right to custody or visitation with
their son. (In re Schmidt et al, 1986,p. 5)
Permission to intervene refers to the legal concept of intervention of rights.
Intervention of right allows anyone with a legal interest in the subject matter to entera
case in order to protect their right or to impose a claim (Black et al., 1991).
Intervention of right assumes that a citizen must possess the right in order to intervene;
however, it is left to the justice, after a showing of facts, to grant citizens the rightto
intervene. Because intervention of right rests on the discretion of the justiceto
determine that a right already exists (Indermark, 1992), grandparentsare vulnerable
when petitioning for statutory visitation rights. Consequently, grandparental rightsrest
in the hands of justices and grandparents' ability toargue their case effectively with
facts that follow the dictates of grandparent and other related statutes.
Derivative approach to grandparent visitation rights. Grandparentswere also
denied legal standing based on derivatives of right visitation statutes (Gushlawet al..
v. Rohrbaugh et al., 1996; In the Matter of the Adoption of 0. D. L.. 1987; Kasper v.59
Nprdfelt, 1991; Olson v. Flinn, 1986; Sowers v. Tsamolias, 1997; State ex rel Costello
v. Honorable F. G. Cottrell, 1994; Suster v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,
1993; Vice v. Andrews, 1997). This theory is most applicable in cases of adoption and
the termination of parental rights. If a parent lost his or her parental rights by adoption
or some other mechanism of termination such as child maltreatment, grandparents'
legal ties to their grandchild were severed. Some justices reasoned that "the legislature
has wisely limited grandparental visitation in adoptions to cases where the childstill
has blood ties to the new parents" (in the Matter of the Adoption of G. D. L, 1987,p.
5). Another example:
We hold, accordingly, that Mrs. Suster's rights as a grandparent were
derivative of her daughter's parental rights and as a result were
terminated when daughter's parental rights were terminated, and she
does not have a recognized interest in the subject matter of this
litigation to warrant intervention as a matter of right. For these reasons,
we affirm the trial court's denial of her motion to intervene (Suster v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 1993, pp.4- 5).
If another individual has adopted the grandchild resulting in the grandparents'
own child losing his or her parental rights, then the grandparents lose all legal ties to
that grandchild. In this case, grandparents do not have any standing to petition for
visitation. In Vice v. Andrews (1997), this point was well stated:
The chancery court found that the adoption, which was granted with the
consent of the biological father, not only terminated any relationship he
might have with his daughter, but also terminated any rights of
visitation which his mother, Ms. Vice, might claim. We agree and
affirm. (p.2)60
In Olson v. Flinn (1986) for example, grandparents were not allowedto
petition for visitation if their own child wasone of the parents in the adoptive parents.
Grandparents had no legal ties or legal standing to petition for visitation with their
grandchild if their own child was not the biological parent of the adopted child.
Special circumstances of family disruption. The lack of family disruptionwas
yet another justification for denying grandparent legal standing. The presence of
family disruption, such as the death of a parent or divorce, sometimes helped
grandparents to receive legal standing. In some of the cases analyzed for thecurrent
study, grandparents were allowed to petition for visitation with their grandchild if their
own child died because death does not terminate parental rights (Castegno et al v.
Wholean, 1996; Enos v. Correria, 1995; In re the Matter of Bridgette Lachae'. 1993;
Rivers v. Godwah, 1996). In other words, when parental rightsare maintained,
grandparents' legal ties to their grandchild are also maintained. Otherwise,
grandparents, absent the death of a child, hadnolegal avenue for standing.
In the absence of divorce, conditions as written in certain statutes, justices
denied grandparents legal standing (Castagno et alv. Wholean, 1996). After a divorce,
the state has an interest in maintaining grandparent-grandchild relationships because
grandparents may provide the grandchild with additional social and tangiblesupports.
As noted by other legal scholars and justices, grandparents'may provide their
grandchildren with emotional (Bostock,1994;Burns,1991;Jackson,1994;Lehrer v.
Davis, 1990; Spradling v. Harris, 1989) and economic supports (Estate of Topel, 1966;
In the Matter of the Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F., 1992). Listeningto the voice
ofa justice helps to explain the reasoning behind statutes with family disruption:61
If the parents of an unmarried minor child are divorced, married but
living apart, under a temporary order or judgment of separate support,
or if either or both parents are deceased, or if said unmarried minor
child was born out of wedlock whose paternity has been adjudicated by
a court of competent jurisdiction or whose father has signed an
acknowledgment of paternity, and the parents do not reside together,
the grandparents of such minor child may be granted reasonable
visitation rights to the minor child during his minority...[provided]
such visitation rights would be in the best interest of the said minor
child. (Enos v. Correia. 1995, p.2)
Grandparent Visitation Was Not in the Best Interest of the Child
In 6% ( =2) of cases grandparents failed to obtain legal standing because said
visitation was not in the child's best interest (David J. & Rita K. v Theresa K. & Lora
Lane Hockenssin, 1993; In The Matter of The Application of Christopher Steven
Herbst. Christopher Steven, 1998). Justices held varying interpretations or approaches
to the best interest of the child. In one situation the justices held steadfastly to the
notion that best interest of the child referred to threat of harm to the child:
However, a vague generalization about the positive influence many
grandparents have upon their grandchildrenfallsfar short of the
necessary showing of harm which would warrant the state's
interference with this parental decision regarding who may see a child.
With respect to our constitutional evaluation, whether a court-ordered
grandparent relationship might be thought of as better or more desirable
for a child is not relevant. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d at 773.
If operating overthe objection of fit parents, grandparental visitation
may be imposed only upon a showing that the child would suffer harm
without it" (In The Matter of The Application of Christopher Steven
Herbst. Christopher Steven, 1998, p. 6).
In the other situation the interpretations of best interest of the child steered
away from tradition. Justices did not believe that the child's best interest was served if62
the child herself opposed court-ordered visitation (David J. & Rita K.v. Theresa K. et
J., 1993). This perspective aligns itself with the Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) decision
in which justices held that children had a right to be heard.
The best interest of the child was not included in other court decisions that
were categorized under statutoiy requirements. Consistent with family law traditions,
another court held in favor of the adoptive parents. In this situation, grandparentswere
denied visitation rights because the child best interest was served by severing ties with
biological family following adoption (Olson v Flinn, 1986). The lack ofa meaningful
grandparent-grandchild prior to the petition by the grandparents was a factor in
another court denying grandparents visitation rights (O'Brien v. O'Brien, 1996).
Two less traditional decisions centered around the child's well-being. In one
case, justices believed that the best interest of the child was not served when a child is
forced to travel over 1000 miles to visit a grandparent (Sposato v. Sposato, 1997).
Justices also held that the child's best interest was not being met when a child is in the
middle of conflict between adults (Puleo v. Forgue, 1993).
Conclusions and Discussion
Ofallthe cases (N = 103) analyzed, 31% of grandparents were denied legal
standing. Of the grandparents who were denied legal standing(a.=32), 84% of cases
being heard in state supreme and appellant courts. In a third of thecases, the legal
precedence set by higher courts was to deny grandparents legal standing because of
visitation rights intruded on parental rights, grandparents failed to meet statutory63
requirements, and the best interest of the child was not being served by allowing
grandparent-grandchild visitation.
One justification used to deny grandparent visitation rights was that such
visitation was an unwarranted intrusion upon parental rights violating a tradition that
protected parental and thmily autonomy. This traditional approach was evident in the
legal reasoning used to support the fundamental rights of biological and adoptive
parents who were fit and married.
Furthermore, parental rights superceded grandparent visitation rights because
the former is constitutionally constructed and the later is statutoly in nature. The
constitutional protections given to parents are based on landmark cases and common
law. Unlike parents, grandparents were more vulnerable. Because grandparent
visitation rights are statutory in nature, justices were given more leeway in decision
making (Avin, 1994; Bohl, 1996).
To intrude on parent's highly guarded, constitutional rights, judges had to find
a compelling state interest. Based on tradition, compelling state interests were threat of
harm to a child or unfit parents. Otherwise, there was no reason to intrude upon the
rights of parents.
Grandparents also were denied legal standing if they failed to meet the
statutory requirements. Although there were several statutory requirements (i.e., an
action pending, pennission to intervene, or jurisdiction), two key ones were
derivatives and family disruption. As other legal scholars have found, the current
study found grandparents' legal standing was derived via their own children (Balzlb,
1994; Bostock, 1994; Hartfield, 1996). If a parent lost legal ties to a child by way of64
adoption or termination of parental rights, then the grandparent also lost legal ties to
their grandchild including an avenue to derive legal standing. This stipulation allowed
justices to deny grandparents legal standing.
Consistent with the research, the lack offamilydisruption resulted in some
grandparents being denied visitation (lBalzlb, 1994; Bostock, 1994; Hartfield, 1996).
Nevertheless, justices believed that the state had an interest in protecting children who
faced family disruption. Grandparent visitation was allowed so that the grandparents
would provide some continuity and social support to the grandchild. In cases of
divorce, the state does have an interest in someone other than the government
subsidizing the family's income. Families headed by single mothers sometimes face
economic hardships and some seek out public assistance. It is in the best interest of the
state to find non public dollars to support children and families.
Justifications surrounding family disruption may make legal sense; however, it
supports the idea that family is married parents and children; therefore, intact families
deserved the highest legal protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Judges and
legislators who hold that grandparents may obtain legal standing if familiesare not
intact are undermining the human capital found in other families.
Social science research has not provided justices with a clear indication of the
benefits of grandparent-grandchildren relationships. As noted in the review of
literature, grandparents may undermine parental authority, increase family stress, and
reduce positive outcomes for parents and grandchildren (Stolba & Amato, 1993;
Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989; Thompson, Scalora, Limber, &
Castrianno, 1991).65
Justices also denied grandparents legal standing by holding to rigid
interpretations of the best interest of the child standard. Within the confines of
traditional family law, the best interest of the child referred to unfit parentsor threat of
harm to a child. By holding to traditions, justices were protecting families from the
personal biases that justices may hold that favor grandparents (Bostock, 1994).
Holding to a rigid interpretation also buffered justices from being accused of abusing
their discretionary powers while protecting a long tradition that careflully guarded
parental andfamilyautonomy (BaIzib, 1994; Shandling, 1986).
Based on the casesanalyzedthat denied grandparents legal standing, the
competing interests of the state against, the rights of parents and children remained
constant. Justices have largely focused on state interests in grandparent visitation that
sometimes compete against the individual rights of parents with a little concern for
children's rights. In one case, judges took into account the children's opinions (David
J. & Rita K v. Lora Lane Hockenssin, 1993). Because the focus was largely on
parental rights, each argument held at its core parents' right to childrearing and to
determine with whom their children should associate. Even the best interest of the
child focused narrowly on parental unfitness including parents' inability to keep their
child from threat of harm.
Consistent with other research, justices denied grandparents legal standing
largely due to statutory requirements (e.g., BohI, 1994; Bostock, 1994; Klyman, 1994;
Waither, 1997). These data showed the legal susceptibility of grandparents because
parental rights continue to supercede grandparent visitation rights. Society has
constructed a fierce guard railing around parental rights with permissible stateintrusion being limited to threat of harm or parental unfitness. The essences of these
ideas are: "The right to the custody and control of one's child is a fiercely guarded
right in our society and in our law. It is a right that should be infringed upon only
under the most compelling circumstances" (Brooks Ct al.. v. Parkerson, 1995,p. 3).
The results of these data mimic other research that examined grandparent visitation
legislation in 50 states (Bostock, 1994; Walther, 1997) and analyses of grandparent
visitation cases (BohI, 1994; Klyman, 1994).67
CHAPTER FIVE
Results: When Legal Standing was Granted and Courts Denied Grandparent
Visitation Rights
Grandparents were denied visitation with their grandchild when (a) statutory
requirements were not met, (b) the fundamental rights of parentswere intruded upon,
and (c) visitation did not served the best interest of the child (See Appendix E).
Statutory requirements were the most frequent justification for denying grandparents
visitation rights (See Table 3).
Table 3 - Justifications for Denying Grandparents Visitation Rights
Justification iiPercentage
Statutory requirements 21 60
Intrude on parental rights 3 9
Bestinterestofthechild 11 31
Total 35 100
Although the same justifications were used to deny grandparents legal
standing, the frequencies were different for grandparents who obtained legal standing
but were denied visitation rights. In denying grandparents legal standing, the
justifications surrounding statutory requirements were used in 81% ofcases; however,68
this justification represented only 60% of cases in which grandparentswere denied
visitation with their grandchild. The best interest of the child standard represented
another 31% of cases inwhichgrandparents were denied visitation rights.
Statutory Requirements
Approximately 60% (! = 21) of grandparents who received legal standingwere
denied visitation rights with their grandchild because of statutory requirements (Bond
v. Yount, 1987; Bopp v. Lino. 1994; Brown v. Brown, 1996; Bush et al. v. Sequallati,
1998; Clark v. Leslie. 1988; In the Custody of B. S. Z-S, 1994; In the Marriage of
Daniel G. Bradshaw, 1994; In the Matter of the Adoption of R. D. S. 1990; Inre the
Adoption of Rideanour et aL, 1991; In re Martin, 1994; In re Lola Francis McCarthy,
1990; In re the Marriage of Dawn M. Soergel v. Soergel, 1990; In the Interest of A. C.
and L. C., 1988; In the Interest of A.M. B. & T. B., 1997; In the Interest of N. S.,
1991; Jimmy S. and Wilma Jean S. v. Kenneth B. and Phvliss B., 1997; Maneret ux.
v. Stephenson, 1996; M. J. Alvarez f7k/a Carison Pecka v. S. R. Carlson. 1991; Reed
v. Glover, 1994; Thompson v. Vanaman, 1986b; Turner v. Turner, 1997). As with
those grandparents who were denied legal standing, the themes under this category
encompassed no action pending, family disruption, and derivatives. Jurisdiction and
permission to intervene were less prevailing themes under this category. Because of
the commonalties among results surrounding legal standing and denial of grandparent
visitation rights, these results focus on family disruption and derivatives.
Special circumstances of thmily disruption. As with legal standing,
grandparents were denied visitation in situations where therewas no family disruption69
(Clark v. Clark, 1988; In re Lola Francis McCarty, 1990; Thompson v. Vanaman.
1986b; Turner v. Turner, 1997). In Brown v Brown Earnhardt (1990), justices
concluded that grandparent visitation rights should be reviewed separately from
parental rights. Recognizing that the potential positive outcomes of the grandparent-
grandchild relationship, justices noted: "However, this Court does not subscribe to the
view that grandparents are to contend for autonomous visitation privileges absent a
showing of exceptional circumstances (p. 3).
State statutes permitted grandparents to petition for visitations when certain
forms of family disruption existed. The death of a parent, divorce, or even a parent
who was unable to fulfill his or her parental duties due to mental illness or
incarceration were possible forms of family disruption.
The rationale behind allowing grandparent visitation when family disruption
existed was to reduce the possible negative outcomes for families and children. This
rationale translates into what legal scholars refer to as a compelling state interest. A
compelling state interest allows grandparents to provide social and economic support
to the children facing some form of family disruption (Bostock, 1994; Burns, 1991;
EstateofTopel. 1966; In re Emanuel S v. Joseph E, 1991; In the Matter of the
Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F.. 1992; Jackson, 1994; King v. King, 1992; Lehrer
v. Davis, 1990; Spradling v. Harris, 1989).
Derivative approach to grandparent visitation rights. Grandparents were
denied visitation under statutes based on a derivative of rights approach to
grandparent visitation. For instance, in Jimmy S. & Wilma Jeans S. v. Kenneth
B. & Phyliss B., (1997), justices denied grandparents visitation with their70
grandchild because the parents' rights were terminated, thereby severing all
legal ties to the grandparent. In the other cases, adoption severed the legal ties
between the grandparent and grandchild and justices held in favor of adoptive
parents' fundamental rights (Beckman v. Boggs, 1995; Bond v. Yount, 1987;
Bopp v. Lino. 1994; Bush et al v. Sequellati et aL, 1998; Clark v. Clark, 1988;
In re the Adoption of Rideanor et al., 1991; In re the Custody of B. S. Z. S.,
1994; In the Interest of A. M. B. & T. B., 1997; In re the Interest of A. C. & L.
,1988; In re the Interest of N. S., 1991; In re the Marriage of Soergel, 1990;
In re Martin, 1994; In the Matter of the Adoption of R. D. S., 1990). The court
in the Bond v. Yount (1987) decision sent a clear message about the
protections given to adoptive parents:
The appellants, the adoptive parents (and maternal grandparents) of
Bobby, appeal the trial court's grant of visitation rights Bobby's
biological (paternal) grandparents. We agree that the trial court erred in
so ruling and reverse the trial court.... The only factual difference
between Mitchell and the case at bar is that this child was not adopted
by strangers but by the maternal grandparents. We do not find this
distinction sufficient to outweigh the policy underlying adoptions. The
judgment of the trial court must be reversed. (Bond v. Yount, 1987,p.
2)
Intruding on Parents Fundamental Rights
In just under 10% of cases (p3) in which grandparents were denied visitation
with their grandchildren. The justification was grandparent visitation wrongfully
intrude upon the parental rights of biological and adoptive parents. In three cases,
judges held steadfastly to the idea that grandparent visitation wrongfully intruded upon71
the fundamental rights of parents (Hawk v. Hawk, 1993; Simmons v. Simmons, 1995;
Ward v. Ward, 1987). Some justices dismissed grandparent visitation cases using the
justification that they were protecting the rights of parents.
Based on tradition, the fundamental rights of parents were protected against
government intrusion unless a compelling state interest existed. Although legislators
have established grandparent visitation statutes to promote and strengthen families,or
to promote the well-being of children whose families were experiencing divorce, these
statutes have not rid this country of its loyalty to parents. This loyalty rests in the
constructs of common law and the constitutional protections carved from landmark
decisions to protect parental rights:
At common law, parents had the right to control and select the persons
with whom their child would associate as long as the parents had not
forfeited this right in a manner recognized by law. Doggie v. Cherry,
Pa. Super., 196 Pa Super. 46, 173k 2d (1961). Thus, it appears that
grandparents had no common-law right to visitation, their rights being
derivative through the natural parent. The parents' obligation to allow
visitation with the grandparent was characterized asa moral, not a
legal, obligation. 57A C.J.S. Parent and Child, Section 41c (1968). This
is the rule generally followed by courts in this country in ruling on
grandparent visitation. (Ward v. Ward, 1987,pp. 1066 - 1067)
Furthermore, the law does not always follow the moral positions of promoting
nurturing parents and healthy children. In Ward v. Ward (1987), judges reasoned that
the government is not in a position to promote the well-being of children and families:
The rule recognizes that government is ill equipped to dictate the details of social
interaction among family members. It also recognizes that parenting right isa
fundamental liberty interest that is protected against unwarranted state intrusion.
(Ward v. Ward, 1987,p. 1069). Despite this fact, is it appropriate to not hold the72
courts accountable for decisions that undermine societal goals that promote nurturing
parents and healthy children?
Best Interest of the Child
Another 31% (ii = 11) of cases involved grandparents whose visitation rights
were denied because justices did not believe the child's best interest was served
(Eberspacher v. Hulme, 1995; Ellis v. Ellis, 1993; Hawkins v. Haley, 1989; In re the
Visitation of Hershel Walker, 1996; In re the Visitation of Neola B. Kanivick, Morris
v. Corzatt, 1988; In the Interest of R. N. C.. 1989; Steward v. Steward, 1995; Strouse
v. Olsen, 1986; lope v. Kaminski, 1990; Williams. ifi et al. v. Williams IV, 1998).
For these cases, unlike the ones where grandparents were denied legal standing,
several interpretations were given for the best interest of the child standard.
One interpretation of this standard that was used to deny grandparents'
visitation with their grandchild was threat of harm (Ellis v. Ellis, 1993; In re the
Visitation of Neola B. Kanvick, 1988; lope v. Kaininski, 1990; Williams.. ifi et al v.
Williams. IV, 1998). If there was no threat of harm, then grandparents were denied
visitation rights (rope v. Kaminski, 1990; Williams. ifi et al v. Williams. IV, 1998).
Grandparents were appropriately denied visitation with their grandchild if there was an
actual threat of harm to the child, such as circumstances in which grandparents
allowedtheir grandchildren to have contact with fathers who were accused or
convicted of sexual abuse(Ellisv. Ellis, 1993; In re the Visitation of Neola B.
Kanvick, 1988). For example:73
Mother opposes grandparent visitation at this point indicating that son
Jason Haslain, age 15, still suffers from the trauma of sex abuse for
which Terry Ellis has been incarcerated in Smyra on a ten year
sentence.... The welfare of the child is the single most important fctor
in determining visitation rights and must not be subordinated to any
other interests. Rogers v. Trent, Del. Supr., 594 Aid 32,22(1991). If
the foregoing is applicable as between the interests of competing
parents, then it is certainly just as applicable as between a grandparent
who seeks visitation versus a parent. (Ellis v. Ellis, 1993, p.2)
Another example illuminates grandparents' inability to honor the restraints set by the
court to protect their grandchild:
Section 40-9-102(2), MCA, allows the court to grant a grandparent
visitation rights only after finding that the visitation would be in the
child's best interest. The District Court chose not to allow visitation in
this matter because the natural Mher lived with his parents, the
Kanvicks, a majority of the time and that the Kanvicks were not able to
ensure that he would not interfere with their visits with the daughter.
Mr. Kanvick testified that he had no plans to restrict his son's comings
and goings form the Kanvick home. He also testified that his son's
stays at the home between three and seven days a week or 'whenever he
feels like it.' Testimonial evidence presented by respondent's expert
reveals that due to possibility of sexual abuse any contact with K. R.'s
father could result in severe psychological damage to K. R. We will not
reverse the District Court absent clearly erroneous findings which result
in an abuse of discretion.... The District Court did not discount the
beneficial effects of the Kanvicks' relationship with their grandchild
and encouraged K. R.s mother to continue to allowvisitsin her home.
The court, however, did recognize that a regular visitation schedule
could most likely force K.R.. to visit her natural fhtheras well. It did not
abuse its discretion refusing such a schedule. Affirmed (In re the
Visitition of Neola B. Kanvick, 1988,p. 5)
Justices denied grandparent visitation using some additional interpretations of
the best interest of the child standard. Justices reasoned that grandparent visitation
would not serve the best interest of the child when visitation undercut parental
authority (Bopp v. Lino, 1994; Morris v. Corzatt, 1988). Judges also justified denying74
grandparents visitation with their grandchild when there was no clear and convincing
evidence that this visitation would serve the best interest of the child (Eberspacher v.
Hulme, 1995). The best interest of the child was also interpreted as not placing
children in the center of conflicts between parents. In Strouse v. Olsen (1986) the
following quotation explains how the child's best interest goes unmet:
Here, the settled record evidences severe ill feelings, bitterness,
animosity between Richard and Olsen. These bad feelings are
highlighted in the settled record, as demonstrate, by a transcription of a
telephone conversation between Richard and Olsen, in which Olsen
threatens civil suits over personal property matters, threatens that the
children were stressfil before and after Olsen's visits, and the children
testified that they no longer desired to visit with Olsen. Under these
facts and circumstances, we conclude the circuit court did not err in
determining that Olsen's visits were not in the children's best interests.
The order appealed from is therefore affirmed. (p. 5)
Additionally, justices denied grandparents visitation rights because there was no
substantial grandparent-grandchild relationship to argue that the child's best interest
was being served (In re the Visitation of Hershel Walker, 1996; Steward v. Steward,
1995). Court reasoning in most of the above instances focused on the child's needs,
although parental autonomy remains at the core of the courts' reasoning.
A final interpretation of the best interest of the child standard focused more on
the structure of the law. Grandparent visitation rights were denied visitation rights
when the judges believed that a ruling in favor of grandparents would undermine the
trial courts' discretion in upholding parents' fundamental rights (Maner etux v.
Stephenson, 1996).75
Conclusions and Discussion
Of the total sample (= 103), 34% of grandparents were denied visitation
rights with their grandchild with 94% of cases being heard in state supreme and
appellant courts. In over a third of cases analyzed for this study, justices in the higher
courts set a precedence that protected the individual rights of parents and children.
Some of the same reasons given to deny grandparents legal standing resulted in
grandparents being denied visitation rights with justifications focusing largely on
statutoly requirements and the best interest of the child. Grandparent visitation is a
statutory right; therefore, it is not surprising that more than half of the cases involved
grandparents being denied visitation because statutory requirements were unmet.
In almost 10% of cases, grandparents were denied visitation rights because
such visitation was an unwarranted intrusion on parental rights. The justifications of
denying grandparent visitation if it intruded upon parental rights coupled with the
justifications of family disruption and derivatives continue topurportthat parental
rights, especially within intact thmilies, supercede grandparent visitation rights.
Grandparent visitation statutes and court decisions that use family disruptionas a
potential justification for intruding upon parental rights are treating parents in intact
families differently than nonintact families. This differential treatments of parents,
based on society's and justices' notion that intact family is better than nonintact
families, continues to be an undercurrent woven in these data.
According to these data the best interest of the child standard was the second
most frequent justification for denying grandparents visitation rights. The
interpretations of this standard included:76
1. The absence of or the potential for threat of harm to the child.
2.Grandparent visitation would undermine parental authority.
3. There was no clear and convincing evidence that grandparent visitation would
serve the child's best interest.
4.Children would be placed at the center of conflict between parents and
grandparents.
5. The absence of a substantial grandparent-grandchild relationship does not
warrant providing grandparents with court-ordered visitation.
6. The trial courts' discretion would be undercut by reversing their decision that
protected the rights of parents when denying grandparents visitation with their
grandchild.
These data support other research findings that show that the legalsystem, legislators
and the courts have not developed a comprehensiveor concise interpretation of the
best interest of the child (Avin, 1994; Balzlb, 1994; Shandling, 1986).
These data also bring into perspective the criticisms surrounding the best interest
of the child. In attempting to protect the interests of children, justices have denied
grandparent visitation rights because there are some potential negative outcomes.
Children do not benefit from parental authority being underminedor experiencing
additional stress due to parent-grandparent conflictsor divided loyalties (Thompson,
Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989; Stolba & Amato, 1993). Overall, these different
interpretations show that the lack of a clear definition of this standard continues and
few state statutes have provided justices withany consistent or clear guidance in this77
area. Does this lack of clarity promote the child's best interest? Is this the precedence
that thmily scientist are willing to accept?
Before leaving the discussion on the best interest of the child, it is pertinent to
recognize the interpretations that remain constant. Although there was a slight shift in
the application of the best interest of the child standard, the interpretation of threat of
harm to the child maintains a legal tradition that promotes parental rights. The rational
basis for maintaining tradition was the state interest in supporting parents who are
charged with the task of raising children to become self-sufficient members of society
(HLR, 1980).
These results mimic those of other legal scholars that have determined that
justices are unwilling to intrude upon the rights of parents unless certain circumstances
like thmily disruption exist (Balzlb, 1994; Hartfield, 1996). These data, like other
studies, show that across the United States, the legal precedence set around
grandparent visitation rights remain in favor of tradition and the intact family.
The other interpretations, excluding the one aimed at protecting judicial
discretion, are focusing more on the rights of children. This is quite consistent with
landmark decisions that allow children right to be heard and to family autonomy.
Grandparent visitation rights are carving out another dimension of children's rights.78
CHAPTER SIX
Results: When Legal Standing was Granted and Grandparents were Granted
Visitation Rights
In 103 cases analyzed, 30% (= 31) grandparents obtained legal standing and
were awarded visitation with their grandchild. Of those grandparents that obtained
legal standing ( = 71), 44% were granted visitation with their grandchildren. The
justifications used by judges to grant grandparents visitation rights differed from those
in which grandparents were denied legal standing and visitation rights. Three
justifications for grandparents obtaining visitation rights were to (a) uphold lower
court decisions, (b) maintain the best interest of the child, and (c) a shift in tradition
(See Appendix F). The most frequent justification for granting grandparents' visitation
with their grandchildren was upholding lower court decisions (See Table 4).
Table 4 Justifications for Granting Grandparents Visitation Rights
Justifications
I Percentage
Upholding Lower Court Decisions
Maintaining the Best Interest of the Child
Shift in Tradition
2271
4 13
5 16
Totals 131 ioo79
Upholding Lower Court Decisions
Based upon the data analyzed for the current study, approximately 71%(r
22) of cases involved justices upholding lower court decisions (Beckman at al.. v.
Boggs at ux., 1995; Bishop v. Piller. 1994; Brown v. Brown, 1996; Camerlingo v.
Camerlingo. 1998; Cockrell v. Sittason, 1986; Goffv. Goff, 1996: Oliver Talley v.
Oliver. 1993; Olson v. Olson, 1995; In the Marriage of Candyce & John D. Perry,
1998; In the Interest of K. R. 1995; In re the Marriage of Kathleen A. Kovash, 1993;
In re the Marriage of Lany D. Jacobson, 1987; King v. King, 1992; Romo at al.v.
Rickok at al., 1994; Rosse v. Rosse, 1994; Rudolph at al v Floyd, 1992; Settle v.
Galloway, 1996; Smith at aL. v. Smith, 1993; Smith Loftin v. Smith, 1993; Snipes v.
g, 1988; Stone v. Short, 1991; Sweeney v. Sweeney, 1994). The themes associated
with this category involved trust in the lower court discretion, the absence of judicial
abuse, discretionary powers, and statutory authorization.
Trust in lower court discretion. Justices elected to uphold the lower court
decisions because they trusted the discretion of those courts and they believed that the
lower courts had better access and understanding of the facts in each case. Some
justices hearing these cases on appeal held that the trial court made no error in
granting grandparents visitation rights (Hicks v. Enlow, 1989; In the Interest of K. R.,
1995).
No abuse of judicial discretion. Without a finding of judicial abuse, justices
upheld lower court decisions that granted grandparents visitation rights (i.e., trial,
juvenile, fmily, and district courts) (Camerlingo v. Camerlingo, 1998; In re the
Marriage of Kathleen A.. Kovash, 1993; Olson v. Olson, 1995; Rosse v. Rosse, 1994;Rudolph v. Floyd, 1992; Settle v. Galloway, 1996; Smith et al.. v. Smith, 1991; Stone
v. Short, 1991; Sweeney v. Sweeney, 1994). Justices at the lower court levels
protected themselves against judicial abuse by following previous landmark and state
decisions and interpreting state statutes. For example:
This case is one of first impression for this court regarding grandparent
visitation rights. However, we have consistently held that, in a
dissolution of marnage action, determinations concerning visitation
with a minor are initially entnisted to the discretion of the trial judge,
whose determinations, on appeal,willbe reviewed de novo on the
record and affirmed in the absence of abuse of the trial judge's
discretion. Hickenbottom v. Hlckenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d
8 (1991). We hold that the same standard of review is to be applied to a
judicial determination of grandparent visitation rights. (Rosse v. Rosse,
1994, p. 3)
Discretionary powers. Judges upheld lower court decisions since lower courts
possessed the discretionary powers in custody and visitation proceedings (Brown v.
Brown, 1996; Rosse v. Rosse, 1994; Settle v. Galloway, 1996). The point is
eloquently expressed in the following quotation:
The court may make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or
visitation with the minor child including an order that provides for the
visitation by a grandparent or other person if that is in the best interests
of the child." As Section 25.24.150(a). Section 25.24.150(a) does not
require the trial court to specify why such visitation is in the best
interests of the children. Instead, it merely states that the trial court may
award such rights if they are, in fact, in the best interests of the
children. Thus it is implicit in the court's decision that such visitation is
in the best interests of the children. The trial court could have
reasonable determined that visitation by the paternal grandparents
would be in the best interests of the children; we see no reason to
require a precise explanation. Casescitedby Ruth do not support a
contrary result. (Brown v. Brown, 1996, p. 5)81
In grandparent visitation cases, justices also were given the ability to invoke parens
patriae powers. That is, justices intruded upon parental rights to protect the interests of
all citizens, especially when a citizen is legally vulnerable:
The State has a competing interest in the welfare of children within its
jurisdiction, and may, as parens patriae, intervene in the family milieu
if a child's welfare is at stake.Princev. Massachusetts supra.
Accordingly, parental rights are not absolute, but are subordinate to the
State's parens patriae power, and must yield to the welfare of the child.
(Preston v. Mercieri. 1990, p.3)
Statutory authorization. Legislators, by way of statutes, have given justices the
legal authority to determine if grandparents should obtain visitation rights (Cockrellv.
Cockrell. 1986; In the Interest of K. R., 1995; In the Matter of Grandparental
Visitation of C. G. F., 1992; In the Marriage of Kathleen A. Kovash, 1993; Maner et al
v. Stephenson, 1996; Thompson v. Vanainan, 1986a). Consequently, justices upheld
lower court decisions because the statutes authorized lower court justices with the
power to determine if grandparents should be awarded visitation with their grandchild.
As noted, there are constraints to judicial discretion, but justices can decide visitation
issues:
If it is in the best interest of K.R. to have visitation with her
grandmother, we hold the court may grant visitation. Although section
598.35 may limit grandparent visitation rights, it does not limit the
statutory authority of the juvenile court to decide the issue. (In the
Interest of K.R., 1995, p. 4)82
Best Interest of the Child
Although noted in other cases, 13% (ii =4) of grandparents were granted
visitation with their grandchildren based on the best interest of the child standard
(Becker v Becker, 1992; Cynthia M. v Priscilla C.. Matthew B.. Norman Ii. 1998;
Phillips S. v Rita A. W., 1996). Judges in In re the Marriage of Larry D. Jacobson.
(1987), pointed out that the legislation that gave the court the authority to "grant
reasonable visitation rights to a grandparent if such visitation is in the child's best
interests" (In re the Marriage of Larry D. Jacobson, 1987,p. 4).
The best interest of the child standard in these cases includedsome traditional
interpretations but also some liberal depictions of this standard. Some have connoted
the best interest of the child in the actual statute and its application. For instance,
according to Delaware's grandparent visitation statute, best interest of the child
referred to:
1.the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to hisor her custody and
residential arrangements,
2.the wishes of the child as to his or her custodian and residential
arrangements,
3.the interaction and interrelationship of the child with hisor her parents,
grandparents, siblings, persons cohabiting in the relationship of
husband and wife with a parent of the child, any other residents of the
household or persons who may significantly affect the child's best
interests (Smith et al. v. Smith, 1993).
The liberal interpretations of this standard reached beyond unfit parentsor threat of
barth to the child to include issues such as the welfare of the child despite parental
objections. In Becker v Becker (1992) justices noted that TMthe welfare of the childis83
the primary, paramount and controlling consideration in determining the question of
visitation and custody of a minor child. The legal rights and claims of either parent
and the wishes and personal desires of said parent must yield, if opposed to what the
court, in the discharge of its duty, regards the welfare of the child to be" (Becker, v
Becker, 1992,p. 3).
In the current data, there was one incidence in which the intergenerational
conflict was settled by the parents and grandparents with the court legalizing the
conditions agreed upon by both parties. The mother of the child agreed to allow
visitation by the paternal grandmother with some stipulations that honored her parental
authority. In Phillips S. v Rita A. W., (1996), justices entered into their opinion the
stipulations that the mother had about grandparent visitation. The mother and the
incarcerated father agreed that the grandmother should visit with the grandchild. The
mother simply wanted the legal authority to discontinue visits if she felt the child was
being harmed. In this case, unlike the Ward v. Ward (1987), justices were able to help
the fmi1y to find amiable solution and to legal put this solution in effect.
Changes within families that include higher divorce rates have shaped justices'
reasoning that the child's best interest was served by granting grandparents visitation
rights. These changes have contributed to the advent of grandparent visitation rights:
The plaintiff seeks the right to visit with her grandchild. Due to the
changing life styles of our society, the court systemwillcontinue to see
an increasing number of such situations. When such circumstances
exist, it is imperative that the court act in the best interest of the
grandchild. In Fiore v. Fiore, 49 N. J. Super. 219,225, 13 9,4.2d 414
(App. Div. 195 8), certif. denied 28 NJ 59, 145,4.2d 168 (1958), the
court held that 'the welfhre of the child is the primary, paramount and
controlling consideration in determining the question of visitation and
custody of a minor child. The legal rights and claims of either parent84
and the wishes and personal desires of said parent must yield, if
opposed to what the court, in the discharge of its duty, regards the
welfare of the child to be. (Becker v. Becker,1992, p.3)
In other circumstances of imily disruption, justicesare providing for the
child's interest when granting grandparents' visitation. Justices reasoned that children
who experienced the death of a parent would need additional socialsupport:
In a situation such as the present one, where the child's natural parent
has died suddenly, the love and commitment of grandparentscan be a
source of security which lessens the trauma occasioned by the parent's
death. To abruptly terminate such a meaningful relationship would be
cruel and inhumane, and would frustrate the policy behindour adoption
statute, which seeks to further the welfare of the child... .The trial court
concluded that the best interests of the child would be served by
continued visitation, and we find no abuse of discretion. We note that
the trial court's order, like all orders concerning visitation, is subjectto
modification at any time upon a showing of changed circumstances
affecting the welfare of the child. (Preston v. Mercieri,1990, p. 6)
Children's need for additional support during life crises is self-evident, but
understandable.
The Shift from Family Law Traditions
Among the cases in which grandparents were granted visitation rights, 16% (p
=5) justified giving grandparents rights ina way that was a significant shift from
tradition (Hicks v. Enlow,1989;In the Matter of the Grandparental Visitation of C. G.
E,1992;Puelo v. Forgue et al.,1986;Raines v Suggs, 1996). This shift from tradition
was evident in several situations: (a) when grandparent visitation was granted although
these rights intruded upon the rights of parents in intact families, (b) whengrandparent85
visitation survived adoption, and (c) when justices interpreted grandparent visitation
statutes as seeking to balance the rights of parents, children, and grandparents.
The shift in tradition allowing an intrusionon parents' fundamental rights. In
King v King (1992), grandparents were awarded visitation with their grandchild
although the parents lived in an intact family. In several othercases, the fi.rndamental
rights of parents who remarried were also intrudedupon (Goffv Goff 1996; Thcksy
Enlow. 1989; in the Matter of the Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F., 1992; Preston
v. Mercieri. 1990; Puelo v. Forgue et al. 1992; Raines v. Sugs. 1996).
Grandparent visitation survived adoptions. Traditionally, adoptiveparents have
had the same legal protection as biological parents. Basedon derivatives of rights
theory, if in an adoption, the grandparents'own child was not one of the adoptive
parents, then parents and grandparents lostalllegal ties with that grandchild. The
current study, five cases involved grandparents who were granted visitation despite the
fact that the grandchild was being adopted (Hicksv. Enlow, 1989; In the Matter of the
Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F.. 1992; Prestonv. Mercieri. 1990; Puelo v. Forgue
c.til,1986; Raines v. Suggs, 1996). Grandparents legal ties to their grandchild
survived after an adoption because (a) the grandparents'own child died and continued
to hold his or her parental rights (Hicks v. Enlow, 1989; In the Matter of the
Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F., 1992;), (b) the grandparentsown child was one
of the adoptive parents (Preston v. Mercieri, 1990), (c) the grandparentsmet the
requirement of the adoption and grandparent visitationstatutes (Puleo v. Forgue et al.,
1992). Based on family law traditions that protected the rights ofadoptive parents, in86
situations in which grandparent visitation rights survived adoption, represents a shift
away from the strong protections afforded adoptive parents:
This court should take the opportunity it missed in In re Martin (I 994),
68 Ohio St.3d 250, 626 N.E.2d 82, to recognize the important public
policy reasons for allowing courts to grant visitation rights to
grandparents in non-stranger adoption cases where such visitation is in
the best interests of the child. This court noted with apparent approval
inInre Adoption of Ridenour (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 327, 574
N.E.2d P1055, 1062, that at least five states grant grandparent
visitation after a stepparent adoption. Adopted children should not
forced to trade a continuing loving relationship with grandparents for
the stability of an adoptive home. Certainly, in many cases it is in the
child's best interest to have both, and should have the power to make
that determination (Sweeney v. Sweeney, 1994,p. 2).
This shift toward allowing grandparent visitation after a child is
adopted also has some constraints. To detennine if grandparents have a right to
visit an adopted grandchild, the visitation must be in the child's best interest
and supportive of parental autonomy. In (In the Matter of the Grandparental
Visitation of C. G. F., (1992), justices outlined several factors to consider when
deciding to allow grandparent visitation when a child has been adopted.
Reasonable visitation may be granted to relatives who have maintained a
relationship with the child that resembles a parent-child relationship. To
determine if visitation should survive adoption, the court must determine what
is in the child's best interest, if the visitation would undermine parental
authority, and if the visitor would respect and adhere to the wishes of the
adoptive parents. These conditions serve to remind citizens that in cases of
adoption, grandparent visitation is not guaranteed. Based on these data,
grandparent visitation rights survived adoption is more of an exception rather87
than the norm. Justices are not rushing to judgment but using a "case-by-case
approach of the Grandparents' Visitation Statute" (In re the Marriage of James
Allen Aragon, 1988,PP. 3 - 4).
Balancing the rights of parents. children, and grandparents. The shift from
tradition involves state interests and the individual rights of citizens. The foundation of
family law has been called upon the courts to balance the rights of parents and
children that sometimes compete against a state interest. Currently, grandparent
visitation cases have caused a reexamination of this traditional competition. In the
advent of grandparent visitation statutes, courts are called upon to balance the rights of
parents, children, and grandparents (King v. King, 1992; Puleoetal. v.. ForgueCtal.,
1992). In other words, the tradition of parental rights being weighed against state
interests expressed in statutes has shifted with the advent of grandparent visitation
This new competition has resultedin areexamination of the rights of children
and grandparents. When the best interest of the child standard is used, courts are
broadening the rights of children. Similarly, there was an underlying assumption that
grandparents have rights:
That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve
the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but
the individual has certain fundamental rights that must be respected.
This statute seeks to balance the fundamental rights of parents,.
grandparents, and the child. (King v. King, 1992, p.3)
In Puleo et al. v. Forgue et al., (1992), after an adoption was completed, grandparents
petitioned for visitation with their grandchild. In this case, justices concluded that88
grandparent visitation survived adoption. The justices went on to say that their were
not setting a precedence that automatically allowed all grandparent visitation to
survive adoption. Their decision was "consistent with the case-by- case approach of
the Grandparents' Visitation Statute, which, by making the granting of visitation
subject to a 'reasonable' standard, balances the best interest of the child and the
custodial parents with those of the grandparent? (Puleo et al. v. Forgue Ct al., 1992,p.
4).
Conclusion and Discussion
Of the 103 cases analyzed, 30% (ii =31) of grandparents were granted
visitation with their grandchildren and over 90% of these cases were heard in state
supreme and appellant courts. The legal precedence being set by these courts are that
parental rights are not absolute. The courts are now being called upon to balance state
interests that sometimes compete against the individual rights of parents, children, and
grandparents instead of just parents and children.
Upholding the lower court decisions. In most instances (71% of caseswithin
this category), justices' justification for allowing grandparent visitation was to uphold
the lower court decision. Justices upheld the lower court decision out of trust for trial
court justices and there was no finding that justices abused their discretionary powers
in granting grandparents visitation with their grandchildren. Justices also upheld lower
court decisions because these courts were vested with more knowledge about the facts
of each case. Justices also were vested with the discretionary authority in visitation89
and custody cases. Additionally, statutes gave justices the authority to determine if
grandparents should be awarded visitation with their grandchildren.
The best interest of the child standard. In almost all of these cases, the
decision to grant grandparents visitation rights was justified by using some aspect of
the best interest of the child standard. In decisions that denied grandparents legal
standing or visitation rights, when the best interest of the child was interpreted as unfit
parents and threat of harm to the child, parents' rights were highly guarded. Unlike
those cases, there was a shift away from the rigid interpretation of this standard to
include the child's opinion, the parents' wishes, the welfare of the child, and the
relationships among different frnily members and parents. The current interpretations
of this standard serve to protect the interests of children, parents, and in a few cases,
grandparents. Furthermore, if citizens were to remain silent about this narrow
definition then that is an assumption of agreement that the child's best interests are
only served when parents are unfit or the child is endanger of harm, a daily minimum
standard.
Changes within families including divorce, and unwed parenthood have
contributed to the expansion of interpretations of the best interest of the child standard
and to the creation of grandparent visitation statutes. Because of the increased
incidence of family disruption, grandparents have become an important potential
resource to fmilies by providing tangible and social support (Johnson & Barer, 1987;
Johnson 1988). Grandparents may also serve as a role model, mentor, companion, and
transmitters of values (Bengston, 1985; Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Denham &Smith, 1989; Hagsted, 1985; Roberto & Stroes, 1995). These familial changes and
adaptations have contributed to the advent of grandparent visitation rights.
This does not mean that justices are ignoring the potential negative influence
of grandparents on families. Judicial decisions and statutes that allow grandparent
visitation under special circumstances of family remain controversial. Critics of this
approach argue that justices are given too much discretion in circumstances of family
disruption and areallowedto use less traditional interpretations of the best interest of
the child standard (BaIzib, 1994; Shandling, 1986). Others argue that the assumption
that grandparent visitation will render positive outcomes is an over generalization
based on romantic views of intergenerational ties (Aldous, 1998; Thompson, Tinsley,
Scalora, & Parke, 1989; Thompson, Scalora, Limber, & Castrianno, 1991). As
mentioned in decisions in which justices denied grandparents legal standing and
visitation, grandparents may undermined parental authority, create additional stress
and conflict, and have other less positive influences on children and families. The
possibility of positive and negative outcomes warrants case-by-case decisionmaking.
Before leaving this discussion on the best interest of the child, it is important to
note that the strict interpretation of unfit parents and threat of harm to a childfailsto
address the developmental concerns of children. In addition, underlying this strict
interpretation is an assumption that children only need minimum daily requirements.
Children are devalued when justicessigninto family law history these ideas:
"The majority opinion and the statute seem to rely on the idea, in
addition to the erroneous belief of a fundamental right in the
grandparent, that the lives of the grandchild and grandparent are
enriched by their association. While such may be true in many cases,
while in others it is not, mere improvement in quality of life is not a91
compelling state interest and is insufficient to justify invasion of
constitutional rights. So long as a family satisfies certain minimum
standards with respect to the care of its children, the state has no
interest in attempting to make things better" (King v. King,1992, p. 5).
The shift from family law traditions. The final justification used by justices
was labeled as a small shift in family law traditions that have largely guarded the
rights of parents. The beginning of this shift rested with the advent and enactment of
grandparent visitation statutes followed by grandparents being awarded visitation.
Evidence of a shift comes from cases in which grandparents visitationwas awarded
andallowedto intrude upon the parental rights of parents in intact including remarried
families. Other evidence occurred when grandparent visitation rights survived
adoptions. Mditionally, once justices interpreted that grandparent visitation statutes
seek to balance the rights of parents, children, and grandparents' it is hard to deny that
a shift from tradition is occurring.
This shift in favor of grandparent visitation implies that families are no longer
strictly viewed as two parents with children. A reexamination of the legal definition of
family is in order. Judges in Becker v. Becker(1992)adequately addressed this issue
by suggesting that The United States Supreme Court has deemed that limitinga
definition of 'family unit' to only those couples that are legally bound by marriage is
unconstitutional. In Stanley v. illinois(1972),the court noted that it would not be
constrained by any rigid or formal definitions as to what can constitutea 'family unit'
but would examine the facts of the case. Nicholson and Singerman(1992)have argued
that if all citizens are endowed with the right to define family and personal
associations (Loving v. Virginia,1967;Moore v the City of East Cleveland,1977),92
then why are grandparents denied the right to define their families? The data from the
current study showed that this question remains unresolved across the country, not just
in Maryland.
Practical applications. These findings are important to grandparents and legal
professionals who side with grandparents. To plan strategically to obtain visitation
rights grandparents and their advocates would do well to examine the ideology of the
lower court justices because according to the data analyzed in this study, statesupreme
and appellant judges upheld lower court decisions. Looking at the circumstances that
justified grandparents being denied legal standing or visitation rights, grandparents
need to cultivate a clear understanding of the grandparent visitation statutes along with
the adoption and custody laws (Haralambie, 1991; Segal & Karp, 1989).
Family disruption appears to open doors for grandparent visitation; however,
grandparents should build substantial relationships with their grandchild if they wish
to have visitation. In King v. King (1992), a substantial relationship evidenced by
daily contact and the grandfather's involvement in the child's extra curricular
activities guided the justices to grant visitation rights to the grandparents. Statutes
alone do not win cases involving human interactions; relationships matter insome
courts (Haralambie, 1991; Segal & Karp, 1989).93
CHAPTER SEVEN
Results
Of the total sample (N = 103), five cases did not deal directly with legal
standing nor with granting or denying visitation (See Appendix G). Thesecases dealt
with issues that had to be decided before judges could address grandparent visitation
petitions. Three of the five cases dealt with issues of whether grandparent visitation
statutes were constitutional. The remaining two cases dealt with a Motion for
Consolidation and Writ of Prohibition. A motion to consolidate is a request to hear
two different but related cases at the same time. For example, a custody and adoption
case may be heard together. A Writ of Prohibition is a request to not comply with a
court-ordered request.
Constitutionality of statutes. The three cases dealing with constitutionality
varied from a traditional to a non-traditional approach. The Florida Supreme Court
took a traditional approach. Judges held that Section 752.01(lXa) of the Florida
Statutes (1993) was unconstitutional because it wrongfWly intrudedon parents'
fundamental rights (Persico v. Russo, 1998). The judges in thiscase referred back to
Von Eiffv. Azicri, (1998), reiterating that "at common law, grandparents hadno legal
right to visit their grandchildren if the child's parents opposed the visitation" (p. 2).
Justices in ReinhardtetaL. v. Reinhardt (1998) took a less traditional
approach. They recognized the importance of protecting the fundamental rights of94
parents; however, those rights are not absolute. Justices referred to state statutes that
intrude on parental tights in order to promote the overall well-being of children whose
parents are divorcing. For families experiencing divorce, the children may find
additional support from grandparents:
Civil Code article 136 is found in the code section governing divorce.
Thus,it provides for court imposed visitation with the children of
divorced parents. See Lingo v. Kelsay. 94-1038p.2 (La. App. 3d Cii.
3/3/95); 651 So. 2d 499, 500. After the fragmentation of the children's
primary family through divorce, the state has a legitimate and
substantial interest in encouraging beneficial extended family
relationships with children. See Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d at 23 1;
Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144,1151 (Wyo. 1995); Campbell v.
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah App. 1995); Hollingsworth v.
H011ingsworth, 34 OhioApp.3d 13, 16, 516 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1986).
In cases, like this one, where one parent is infrequently or not even
involved with the children, the children's relationship with one side of
their extendedfamilymay be lost in the absence of grandparent or
family member visitation. See Lindsey v. House. 29, 790 p. 4 & n.2
(La. App. 2d Cir. 9/24/97); 699 So. 2d I 1 90, 1192; Ray v. Ray, 94-
1478 pp.2-3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995); 657. So. 2d 171, 173.
Additionally, as noted by the district court, the state mandates
ascendant support of descendants in need. La. C. C. art. 229. In
anticipation of a possible order of future support, the state and the
ascendants have a legitimate and substantial interest to maintain
extended family relationships through reasonable visitation. The sum of
these facts and concerns is a compelling interest by the state in
stabilizing broken or single parent families through visitation with
extended family members. (Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 1998,p. 3)
Grandparents hold the burden of proving that visitation serves the best interest of the
child.
Similarly justices in R.. T. v. M. 1. v. J. E. and L. E. (1994), concluded thata
grandparent visitation statute was constitutional despite the fact it intruded upon the
fundamental rights of parents who were married. In an initial hearing the grandparents
were awarded visitation rights. As a result of the second hearing the families were95
referred to a mediation program. Because mediation was ineffective, the familieswere
referred to a mentalhealthadvisor. During this period, the parents filed a motion
claiming that the New Jersey statute was unconstitutional. The justices held that the
legislature created grandparent visitation statutes to balance the competing interests of
grandparents, grandchildren, and parents. Grandparents were not given visitation
automatically. The statute has outlined eight factors that should be weighed in
detennining if the child's best interest would be served by granting visitation to the
grandparents. For example, New Jersey has a statute that outlines the circumstances
under which visitations should be awarded to grandparents includinga finding of that
this visitation serves the child'sbestinterest. These are some of the other factors that
used to determine if visitation serves the child's best interest:
1. The relationship between the child and applicant;
2. The relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with
whom the child is residing and the applicant;
3. The time which has elapsed since the child last had contact with the
applicant;
4. The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the
child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing;
5. If the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement
which exists between the parents with regard to the child;
6. The good faith of the applicant in filing this application;
7. Any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the
applicant, and
8. Any other factor relevant to the best interest of the child.
c. With regard to any application made pursuant to this section, itshall
be prima facie evidence that visitation is in the child's best interest if96
the applicant, had, in the past, been a full-time caretaker for the child.
T. v. M 1. v. J. E. and L. E.. p. 2, 1994)
As with decisions that granted grandparents visitation with their grandchildren,
the best interest of the child standard was less rigidly interpreted.
Motion for consolidation. In R. K. and L. K. et al..v. A. J. B. and H. B. (1995),
grandparents petitioned to consolidate an adoption with their visitationcase. The
reason for the petition of consolidation was the grandparents wanted an opportunity to
oppose the adoption. Justices reasoned that this was not a consolidation motion but a
motion to intervene. Additionally, judges reasoned that the adoption wouldnot
interfere with the grandparents' visitation petition; however, grandparentswere not in
a position to petition for a consolidation hearing because they were not the parents of
the child. The.judges denied the motion of consolidation, but protected the
grandparents' interest by allowing them to intervene in the adoption hearing:
The motion for consolidationwillbe denied, but the grandparents will
be permitted to intervene and present relevant evidence at the adoption
hearing. Because the grandparents' visitation actionwillnot be barred if
the adoption occurs, there is no reason why both issues should be
resolved based upon a record made at the same hearing. While the
parties may be called upon to testify at both heaiings the overlap of the
testimony at those hearingswillnot be so substantial as to suggest that
any particular advantagewillbe gained through consolidation. It is
preferable that there be separate hearings so that the focus on each
important issuewillnot be blurred by the confluence of all the
testimony on both subjects at one sitting. (R. K. and L. K. et al..v. A. J.
B. and H. B., p. 5, 1995)
Writ of prohibition.In State of West Virginia. cx Rel David Allen B. v. the
Honorable L. Sommerville. Jr. (1995), David Allen B. soughta Writ of Prohibition to
prevent the circuit court from forcing him to comply with a DNA fingerprinting blood97
test. David and the child's mother had always presented him as the father of the
grandchild. The maternal grandparents wanted to prove that David Allen B. was not
the child's biological father. Justices held in favor of the alleged father and noted that
grandparents do not have legal standing in paternity cases:
We hold that while an alleged biological parent has standing to challenge
the paternity established pursuant to W. Va. Code 48A-6-6(b) (1990),
that same right is not vested in a grandparent of a child" State of West
Virginia.. exRdDavid Allen B. v The Honorable L. Sommerville.. Jr.,
1995).
This case shows the lengths to which some grandparents will go to maintain a
connection to their grandchild. These efforts begin at the home and land in the courts.
Conclusions and Discussion
Constitutionality. Grandparent visitation cases raised issues of
constitutionality. Two out of three courts held that grandparent visitation statutes were
constitutional, although these statutes intruded upon the fundamental rights of parents.
The judges in the Florida case held strictly to common law and a tradition that protects
the social construction of intact fimilies and declared that the grandparent visitation
statute was unconstitutional.
For the cases in which the statute was deemed constitutional, one court
acknowledged the state interest in granting grandparents visitation with their
grandchild is to give families experiencing some form of disruption some stability. In
another case, justice reiterated the guidelines for determining if grandparent visitation
served the best interests of the child. These two justices held in favor of the98
grandparents, which represents a small shift away from tradition, but a shift just the
same.
Unique legal arguments made by grandparents. At the same time, grandparents
used some unique legal arguments to gain access to their grandchildren. These
involved a motion to consolidate and a request for a paternity test. In these cases,
being heard was a positive outcome for grandparents. In R. K. and L. K. et al.. v. A. J.
B. and H. B. (1995), the grandparent motion of consolidation was declined, but the
judge provided another avenue for the grandparent. The judges recommended that the
grandparent file a petition to intervene in the adoption hearing, which signified a shift
from tradition. To be specific, when a child is adopted both a parent and the related
grandparent lose all legal ties to that child. To be allowed to intervene in an adoption
case changes the protections afforded adoptive parents who in the eyes of the law hold
the same rights as biological parents.
Justices in Reindhart v. Remhardt (1998) had the same disposition toward the
goal of grandparent visitation statutes as did the justices in King v. King. (1992).
According to justices in these two cases, grandparent visitation statutes seek to balance
the rights of parents, children, and grandparents.
These five cases directly influenced the outcomes of grandparent visitation
statute cases. These cases serve to show that grandparent visitation rights may have
some success in the courts, especially in cases were the statutes that created these
rights are found to be constitutional. On the other hand, grandparents' ability to
intervene in cases that determine the fate of their grandchild has also becomean
avenue for grandparents to obtain legal standing and visitation with their grandchild.CHAPTER EIGHT
Discussion
Summary of Findings
No legal standing. Thirty-one percent (ii = 32) of grandparents failed to obtain
legal standing because visitation (a) intruded upon parents fundamental rights, (b) did
not meet statutory requirements, and (c) failed to serve the child's best interests. The
most frequent occurring justification used to deny grandparents legal standing was a
failure to meet statutory requirements that included a lack of family disruption. The
overall message being sent in court opinions that denied grandparents' legal standing
was that parental rights remain paramount and supercede grandparents' visitation
rights.
Legal standing and denied visitation. Thirty-five out of 103 (34%) of cases
involved grandparents who obtained legal standing, but were denied visitation with
their grandchild. Although the frequencies differed, judges used the same justifications
to deny grandparents legal standing and visitation rights (i.e., intrudes upon parental
rights, fills to statutory requirements, and does not serve the best interest of the child).
The varying interpretations of the best interest of the child standard were unique to
justifications used to deny grandparents' visitation with their grandchild. Although
threat of harm was among these interpretations, undermining parental authority and
placing children in the middle of adult conflicts were also included. The message that100
justices were sending when denying grandparent visitation rights is similar to the
message sent when denying grandparents' legal standing.
Legal standing and granted visitation. Thirty percent (ii = 31) of grandparents
were granted legal standing and visitation rights. The justifications differed from those
situations in which grandparents were denied legal standing or visitation rights.
Upholding lower court decisions was the most frequent justification for granting
grandparents the right to visit with their grandchild. For instance, judges
acknowledged the advantages that trial court justices have over them in terms of
knowledge of the facts and statutoiy authorization in custody and visitation cases.
The other justifications show a shift in family law traditions from maintaining
the strong guard railings of parental rights. The shift was clearly seen in situations in
which grandparents wereallowedto intrude on intact families, visitation was allowed
after the grandchild was adopted, and the best interest of the child standard was
interpreted to include children's opinions and a contextual understanding of
intergenerational relationships. The message being sent by judges who granted
grandparents visitation rights is that parental rights are not absolute.
Legal standing and other issues. Two out of three justices found grandparent
visitation statutes to be constitutional. In anotherlegaldispute, justice did no allow
grandparents to petition to consolidate an adoption and visitation case, but justices did
recommend a viablelegalsolution. The justices recommended a petition to intervene
in the adoption cases and this recommendation was placed in the actual opinion.
Out of the five cases that dealt withlegalissues that were pertinent to any
forthcoming grandparent visitation case, two held in favor of parental rights. One101
court held that a grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional and the other held
that grandparents could not petition for a paternity test. The overallmessage of these
cases is that grandparent visitation rights, while delicate, have been instituted.
Discussion
Parents' fundamental rights. How much are justices willing to intrude upon the
fundamental rights of parents in grandparent visitation right cases? Family law
traditions that protect parental rights continue to exist with parental rights having
greater legal strength than grandparent visitation rights. In over 67 of 103 (65%) cases
grandparents were denied legal standing or visitation, compared to 31 (31%) of
grandparents being awarded standing and visitation rights. Among the fivecases that
dealt with other issues, three fuvored grandparents. In general, grandparentsare
gaining some legal ground, but parental rights holds the stronger constitutional
protections via common law, landmark cases, and tradition.
Looking at decisions that denied grandparents legal standing and visitation
rights, absent a compelling state interest such as threat of harm or parental unfitness,
justices were usually not willing to intrude on parents' rights by granting grandparents
visitation with their grandchildren. This unwillingness stands on a foundation of
common law and landmark cases. As one judge stated: "coercing grandparent
visitation over parental objection demonstrates a respect for family privacy and
parental autonomy" (Ward v. Ward, 1987,p. 1069). Some justices have held this view
because in their eyes "government is ill equipped to dictate the details of social
interaction among family members" (Ward v. Ward, 1987,p. 1069).102
Under common law,, grandparents do not have a legal right to visitation with
grandchildren against the wishes of the parents. Parental rights are constitutional
constructions (i.e., landmark cases and common law), whereas grandparent visitation
rights are purely statutory. Thus, in order for a grandparent to gain visitation rights, a
statute must exist and grandparents must adhere to all conditions set in that statute.
Grandparents are vulnerable because their rights not only depend upon the enactment
and conditions of a statute, but grandparents are largely dependent upon a pending
action of divorce, custody, or adoption. The death of a parent may also provide
grandparents with some legal avenues to gain access to their grandchild.
Some social scientists agree with judges who hold on to this tradition that
protects parental and family autonomy, especially within intact families.. Thompson
and his colleagues (1991) used variability in grandparenthood to substantiate the need
to protect parental and familial autonomy. For instance, grandparenting styles range
from distant to involved (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Hagestad, 1985; Roberto &
Stroes, 1995). According to opponents ofgrandparentvisitation, this variability has
been ignored and a romanticized illusion of grandparents has been emphasized that
avoid issues of parental boundaries, authority, and family (Thompson, Scalora,
Limber, & Castrianno, 1991; Thompson, Tinsley, Scalora, & Parke, 1989)
A shift away from a tradition that protects parental rights. Grandparents
successfully lobbied legislators into enacting visitation statutes in 50 states in less than
20 years (Bostock, 1994; Burns, 1991; Hartfield, 1996). In the current study, 30% (ii =
31) of grandparents were awarded legal standing and visitation with their
grandchildren, which indicates a slight intrusion upon on parental rights. These legal103
accomplishments show that grandparents have won some legal grounds including
having their voices heard before courts.
The fact that a few judges granted grandparent visitation in traditional intact
families and allowed after an adoption shows that grandparents are gaining legal
ground. In five more recent cases, however, grandparent visitation survived adoption
(Hicks v. Enlow, 1989; In the Matter of the Grandparental Visitation of C. G. F., 1992;
Preston v. Merceori, 1990; Puelo v. Forgue et al, 1986; Raines v. Suggs, 1996). Since
biological and adoptive parents hold the same legal parental rights, a paradigm shift is
occurring when justices allowed grandparents to visitation following an adoption.
Prior to the advent of grandparent visitation statutes, courts were called upon to
balance the rights of parents and children that sometimes compete against state
interests. Results of this study indicated that justices sometimes sought to protect the
interests of parents, grandparents, and children (King v. King, 1992; Puleo et al. v..
Forgue et al., 1992; Reinhardt v. Reinhardt. 1998). This too is a paradigm shift.
Even when examining cases that challenged the constitutional soundness of
grandparent visitation cases, grandparents appeared to be winning some ground. In
Reinhardt v. Reinhardt (1998) and R. T. v. M.T. v J. E. and L. E. (1994), justices held
that Louisiana's and New Jersey's grandparent visitation statutes were constitutional
despite the fact these statutesallowedthe state to intrude upon the fundamental rights
of intact families. In Reinhardt v. Reinhardt (1998), the grandparent visitation statute
was deemed constitutional because it (a) was narrowly drawn and rationally related to
a state interest, (b) was not unduly intrusive on the parental right of privacy, and (c)
operated to balance the competing interests of the parent, the extended family, and the104
children. This stance is in direct conflict with the premise that the only justifiable
government intrusion into families has to have the following circumstances: (a)
potential threat of to the child, (b) unfit parents, or (c) the contemporary view of
family disruption. When judges make decisions on constitutionality, it is sendinga
message about its importance and the legal soundness of a statute.
Taken together all of above facts show that grandparents are gaining legal
ground. Although Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) gave grandparentssome
legal protection, justices are interpreting that grandparents do have some rights via
state statutes. Although grandparents have some rights, their visitation rights are not as
strong as parental rights.
Myth about families. Among the five myths about families, two appear to be
more applicable to the current study. The first myth relates to the "ideal American
family." The other focuses on families as harmonious institituions (Anderson & Hill
Collins, 1995).
Monolithic myth about families. This myth is a social construction about the
ideal family being two parents with children. The data for situations in which
grandparents were denied legal standing and visitation rights was justified by a family
law tradition that provided intact families with more regard and legal protections than
nonintact families. Justices were more willing to intrude on parentalrightswhen
families were not intact than when families were intact. Justices justified denying
grandparents legal standing and visitation in the absence of family disruption (i.e.,
Castegno et al.. v Wholean, 1996; Enos v. Correia, 1995) and granted it when family
disruption existed (i.e., Becker v. Becker, 1992; Preston v. Mercieri, 1990).105
By allowing grandparents to petition for visitation when familiesare not intact,
justices are giving parents in intact families greater protection thanparents in
nonintact fhmilies. This establishes a hierarchy with the best family beingan intact
family. Furthermore, this differential treatment implies that nonintact familiesare less
fit than intact thmilies to raise their children.
The rational behind this differential treatment was that grandparents have the
potential to provide their grandchild with social and economic support in the face of
family disruption (Balzlb, 1994; Bostock, 1994; Burns, 1991; Digest of Recent
Judicial Decisions, 1993; Jackson, 1994). For example, justices in Goffv. Goff (1996)
noted that grandparents sometimes hold the symbolic roles of family watchdog,
arbitrator, or fmiIy historian.
Some justices recognized that differential treatment of intact fmiliesposes
problems because intact families are not free of issues with child maltreatment and
other familial concerns. Some justices recognize that even in the absence of child
maltreatment, there is no compelling constitutional requirement that the legislature
must defer, in every instance, to the parental autonomy of an intact family over that of
a nomntact family. To do so allows greater intrusion by the state into families headed
by "widowed, divorced, remarried, or unmarried parent" (Lehrerv. Davis, 1990, p. 4).
These issues raise numerous questions. Is it time to readdress the definition of the
family? Is it time to construct protections for other familial forms? Whatavenues must
be taken to diminish the social and legal hierarchy given to intact familiesover
families with varying structures? What would it take toempowerallfamilies?106
This differential treatment is not only seen in the legal arena, but social
scientists also have been aware of it (Andersen & Hill Collins, 1995; Baca Zinn, 1991;
Simmons v. Simmons, 1995; Ward v. Ward, 1987). There was an underlying
assumption by justices that parents in intact families were better than parents in
nonintact families. These assumptions coincide with the monolithic myth about
families. By treating nonintact and intact families differently, the courts are
marginalizing families and supporting aspects of this myth.
Families are harmonious institutions. Another social construction is that
families are always joyful havens. This myth ignores the natural conflicts that result
from nonnal life events or from family crises. Using a justice's own words, these
cases dispel the myth that families are harmonious institutions
In closing, I feel compelled to express my regret at the inability of the
litigants in the instant case to function as a harmonious extended family
unit. It is particularly regrettable that children who love both their
parents and grandparents have become pawns in animosities and
differences among adults. This opinion is not to be taken as the Court's
endorsement of the position taken by the natural parents in this matter;
indeed, the Court would remind them of what other courts have
stressed: that this is the moral duty of the parents to promote and
strengthen association between grandchildren and grandparents. (Ward
v. Ward. 1987, p. 1071)
In Herndon v Tuhey (1993), justices admitted to the inadequacies of the law in solving
personal problems within families. The courts may not be the best place to resolve
these tensions; however, some families have found themselves in the courts when
intergenerational conflicts arise.
Some of the life events or crises involve distal and proximal factors. The
increase in life expectancy and decrease in child births are macro and micro changes107
that have also contributed to the dialog on grandparenthood and grandparent visitation
rights (Aldous, 1998; Hooyman & Kiyak, 1996). Withover 94% of older adults
becoming grandparents (Hooyman & Kiyak, 1996), grandparents have not only
obtained some statutoiy rights to visit with their grandchild, butsome grandparents
were awarded visitation rights against parents' wishes. These changes have created
challenges to some families.
Family crises such as the death of a parent or divorce have also influenced
grandparenting (Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1986; Johnson, 1995). Grandparenthood isnot
a monolithic paradigm; therefore, the intergenerational issues vary. Despite these
variations, family crises have contributed to grandparenthood and the advent of
grandparent visitation rights.
In short, families are interconnected with many systems. Distal and proximal
factors such as increased longevity, decreased fertility rates, and olderadultscoincided
with the enactment of grandparent visitation statutes (Hooyman & Kiyalç 1996;
Szinovacz, 1998). These statutes are a response to changes within families and the
larger contextual environment. These changes reflect society's views about parental
rights, family autonomy, and grandparent rights: Just as society is shaping its views
around these issues, so are judges.
Why Are Grandparent Visitation Rights Important to Family Sciences?
As the ecological model asserts, families are affected both directly and
indirectly by multiple contexts of the environment in which they live (Bronfenbrenner,
1977, Salkind, 1985). Because laws do have an impacton families (Melton, 1987;108
Purnell & Bagby, 1993; Walters, 1983) law is a viable research area for social
scientists. By fostering understanding of the intersection of the courts and families,
family scientists will increase understanding of the impact, both direct and indirect,
that the legal system has on family functioning. For example, the changed fault
divorce to no fault divorce impacted many marriages. More recently, laws concerning
access to adoption records have profoundly affected many families.
It is important to recognize that the impact of laws cannot be measured only by
the direct effect they have on certain families. Laws set boundaries in whichwe are all
expected to operate. For example, a law that sets the speed limit at 55 mph not only
impacts persons fined for speeding, but also every person that driveson that road.
Similarly, the impact of grandparent visitation rights on families should not be
measured only by the small number of families that have broughtcases, but rather by
the boundaries on relationships within families that are established by these statutes.
An illustration comes form a classroom discussion of grandparent visitation
cases. After class, a student commented that, at 16 years of age, her sister gave birth to
a baby. The student's parents were very involved in rearing the child. The sister and
her parents quarreled often and the sister frequently threatened to take her baby from
her parents. The student said that she wanted to tell both her sister and herparents
about grandparent visitation rights because it would help them to smooth out the
quarrels between them. She thought that if her parents knew about these rights, they
would feel more empowered to do what they thought was right for the baby, and the
sister would be less likely to threaten her parents with taking the childaway from her109
parents. In other words, the law set different boundaries for the relationships among
the parent, grandparents, and child.
Future Research
There are numerous questions for future research. A study of the grandparents
who were awarded visitation with their grandchild would be important. Some
questions that could be posed: (a) How did the parent-grandparent relationship fair
after this court-ordered visitation? (b) How did the grandchild benefitor not benefit
from the visitation? (c) What type of grandparenting style existed following this court
order? Grandparents, grandchildren, parents, and attending attorneys may be
interviewed to answer these questions. These questions may provide researchers and
courts with needed information about the influence of court-ordered visitation on
children and families. For example, program counselors may help grandparents to
empower parents to become more self-sufficient economically and socially so they are
able to better care for their child.
These questions may also assist programs to develop additional approaches to
promoting family functioning and healthy developmental outcomes in children when
families are facing challenges between generations. In additional, these questions may
assist programs whosegoalto support grandparents raising grandchildren. Responses
to these questions may enlightenfamilymediators with insights into the core problem.
For grandparent visitation advocates, a pertinent study to move the country
toward enacting a federal grandparent visitation statute, would be to find out the utility
of visitation in the lives of children. What effect did the court-ordered visitation have110
on family functioning and child development? Do differences exist between fmiIies
with court-ordered visitation and those without this court mandate?
Another study of interest would interview grandparents, children, and parents
to examine critical issues that led to a legal petition for visitation rights. A pertinent
question would be how the social construction of family influenced the conflicts
between parents and grandparents that led them to the courthouse door. Another
question would center on how the social scientist creates evaluation studies to address
issues of best interest of the child and family functioning toadjustto court-ordered
and life cycle changes faced by contemporary families.
Limitations
As a family scientist with knowledge of family law, this study was influenced
by the researcher's biases toward helping families that sometimes conflict with the
legal reasoning of family law. Data analyses were also influenced by the researcher's
social location as a Black southern female has longstanding values toward respecting
elders and whose definition of family includes intergenerational and fictive ties. The
literature reviewed for this study also has influenced the researcher's perspective on
grandparent-grandchild relationships and the legal issues surrounding grandparent
visitation rights.
These data filled to give a complete contextual understanding of what
transpired in the courtroom. For instance, these data do not include the actual verbal
and nonverbal communication of parents, grandparents, children, and other
participants. Additionally, the data was only compared to legal and family studies111
research. The influence of race, ethnicity, income, education, age, and gender cannot
be adequately explored. In other words, personal interviews with parents, children,
grandparents, attorneys, or justices would provide a clearer picture of the family and
legal issues encircling grandparent visitation rights.
Summary
Parents continue to hold a higher level of legal protections when compared to
grandparents. Grandparent visitation rights are statutory making them less strong than
the constitutionally constructed rights of parents. Despite this fact, grandparents are
obtaining legal ground as they petition for visitation with their grandchildren.
Evidence of this legal ground is found in decisions to allow grandparents to visit their
grandchild when fmilies are intact and parents who are fit or when the legal ties
between grandparents and grandchildren are not severed after an adoption.
Furthermore, a very limited number of justices have included in their opinions that
legislators enacted grandparent visitation right statutes to seek a balance between the
rights of parents, children, and grandparents. Taken together, these represent a shift
away from thmily law traditions. This shift is very slight because parental rights
"supercede" and remain "paramount" to grandparent visitation rights.112
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Appendix A
Number of Grandparent Visitation Cases129
Appendix A- Number of Grandparent Visitation Cases
State
fStudy Cases Omitted Cases
Alabama 13 5
Alaska 1 0
Arizona 0 1
Arkansas 4 2
California 1 1
Colorado 7 0
Connecticut 2 0
Delaware 10 3
Florida 4 0
Georgia 2 0
Hawaii 1 1
Idaho 0 1
Illinois 1 0
Indiana 1 1
Iowa 5 3
Kansas 1 3
Kentucky 2 0
Louisiana 3 0
Maine 1 1130
Appendix A Number of Grandparent Visitation Cases (Continued)
State Study CasesOmitted Cases
Maryland 3 1
Massachusetts 2 0
Michigan 1 0
Minnesota 1 0
Mississippi 5 1
Missouri 1 0
Montana 5 0
Nebraska 5 1
Nevada 2 0
New Hampshire 2 2
NewJersey 5 1
NewMexico 1 0
NewYork 1 0
North Carolina 1 1
North Dakota 4 3
Ohio 6 1
Oklahoma 2 0
Oregon 1 1
Pennsylvania 1 1
Rhode Island 3 0131
Appendix A Number of Grandparent Visitation Cases (Continued)
State Study CasesOmitted Cases
South Carolina 1 0
South Dakota 2 0
Tennessee 1 1
Texas 5 9
Utah 2 1
Vermont 2 1
Virginia 1 0
Washington 3 1
West Virginia 4 1
Wisconsin 3 1
Wyoming 4 0
Total 139 50132
Omitted CasesLegal Issue
These cases dealt with
other legal issues (i.e.,
judicial prejudice or
discretion, venue, fees,
child support, and other
peripheral issues).
Appendix B - Omitted Cases
Case Name
W.G..D.G..andSG.
v. W. B.. B. B.. and
State Dept. of Human
Resources
Jones v. Breshears and
Breshears
Palmer v. Bolton
Sanders v. Sanders
Court
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Court of CivilAppeals
of Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Supreme Court of
Arkansas
Maria S et al. v. Maria SFamily Court of
etal. Delaware
Henderson v. Forster &Family Court of
Henderson Delaware
Paroksky Burdsal Family Court of
Delaware
Doe v. Roe Intermediate Court of
Appeals of Hawaii
133Appendix B - Omitted Cases (Continued)
These cases dealt with
other legal issues (i.e.,
judicial prejudice or
discretion, venue, fees,
child support and other
peripheral issues).
Daugherty v. Ritter Supreme Court of
Indiana
In re the Marriage of Supreme Court of Iowa
Ruth Marie Bolson
In the Matter of Supreme Court of
Mitchell Taylor Kansas
In the Matter of the Supreme Court of
Marriage of D. Scott Kansas
andR. Scott
The State Ex Rel. Supreme Court of Ohio
Kaylor v. Judge
Browning
In the Matter of the Supreme Court of
Marriage of Francine Oregon
Marie Hoim
S. Von Behren v. W. Court of Appeals of
and L. Von Bebren Texas
134Appendix B - Omitted Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
other legal issues (i.e.,
judicial prejudice or
discretion, venue, fees,
child support, and other
peripheral issues).
These cases dealt with
other third parties
petitioning for visitation,
custody or guardianship,
adoption, or conservator.
Case Name Court
In re Anabelle CifarelliSupreme Court of
Vermont
W. Joseph & J. Coots v.Court of Appeals of
Leanard Texas
Chavers v. Hammac Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Peavv and Peavy v.
Dollar
In the Matter of the
Adoption of Angela
Michelle Perkins
InreRobertA. etal.
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Supreme Court of
Arkansas
Court of Appeals of
California
'35Appendix B - Omitted Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
other third parties
petitioning for visitation,
custody or guardianship,
adoption, or conservator.
Case Name
Finck v. Honorable
Thomas W. O'Toole et
al.
Court
Supreme Court of
Arizona
Stockwell (Porter) v. Supreme Court of Idaho
Stockwell
Lihs et al. v. Lihs Supreme Court of Iowa
In the Marriage of KelliSupreme Court of Iowa
Yvette Michell
In re Senator J. Supreme Court of
Christopher Hood Kansas
Beckman et al. v. BoggsCourt of Appeals of
InreMelanieS. etal.
Ziebarth v. Ziebarth
Maryland
Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine
Supreme Court of
Nebraska
In the Interest of N. W.Supreme Court of North
Dakota
136Appendix B - Omitted Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
other third parties
petitioning for visitation,
custody or guardianship,
adoption, or conservator.
Case Name Court
Bodwell v. Brooks Supreme Court of New
Hampshire
Zack v. Fiebert Superior Court of New
Jersey
In re A.M.A. T.N.A.. Supreme Court of North
and N.D.A. Dakota
In re the Custody of Supreme Court of
H.S.H.-K Wisconsin
The State ExRd. Supreme Court of Ohio
Káylor v. Judge
Bruening
Moore v. Moore Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania
Claymore v. Serr Supreme Court of South
Dakota
Bower and Bower v. Court of Appeals of
Neasbitt Texas
137Appendix B - Omitted Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue Case Name Court
Issues dealt with another
third party petitioning for
visitation, custody or
guardianship, adoption, or
conservator.
This case was heard at the
appellant level, the state
supreme court cases were
used for this state.
Bosakewich v.
Honorable R. Webb
Court of Appeals of
Texas
In the Interest of D.L.B.Court of Appeals of
Texas
Landry v. Nauls Court of Appeals of
Texas
S. Valdez and D. Court of Appeals of
HenniRan v. Adam Texas
Valdez et al.
Wright v. Wright
State of Utah in the
Interest of J.W.F.
Cole v. Thomas
Court of Appeals of
Texas
Supreme Court of Utah
Court of Appeals of
Kentucky
138Appendix A Omitted Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue Case Name Court
This case dealt with the
reinstatement of an
attorney's license.
This case was outside the
timeline of current study.
This case dealt with
transportation issues.
This case dealt with
conditions of grandparent
visitation.
for reinstatement
Roberts v. Ward
R. Capello Jr. v. M.
Capello
In re Custody of E.T.
and D.T.
Supreme Court of
Mississippi
Supreme Court of New
Hampshire
Court of Appeals of
Texas
Court of Appeals of
Washington
139140
Appendix C
Remanded CasesLegal Issue
These cases were
remanded to deal with
issues concerning the best
interest of the child.
Appendix C - Remanded Cases
Case Name Court
Weathers and WeathersCourt of Civil Appeals
v. Weathers Compton of Alabama
Mills and Mills v.
Parker and Mills
Lehrer v. Davis
Herndon v. Tuhey
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Supreme Court of
Connecticut
Supreme Court of
Missouri
Schemp-Cook v. CookSupreme Court of North
Dakota
In re Whitaker
Campbell v. Campbell
Jean H. v. Pamela Kay
R.
Supreme Court of Ohio
Court of Appeals of
Utah
Supreme Court of
Appealsof West
Virginia
141Appendix C - Remanded Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases were
remanded to deal with
issues concerning the best
interest of the child.
Case Name Court
In re the Petition of Supreme Court of
Sharon K. Nearhoof toAppeals of West
Adopt David Andrew Virginia
Nearhoof
In re the Interest of Supreme Court of
Brandon S. et al. v. Wisconsin
Laura S. and Micheal R.
Godwin V Bogart. Court of Civil Appeals
Bogart. and Bogart of Alabama
F. H.&B. R v. K. L. Court of Appeals of
a Colorado
In re the Marriage of Court of Appeals of
James Allen Colorado
In the Marriage of LindaCourt of Appeals of
Peterson Colorado
Good von Eiffv. AzicriSupreme Court of
Florida
Fowler v. Knebel et p1.Supreme Court of
Georgia
142Appendix C - Remanded Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
statutory requirements
including adoptions,
permission to intervene,
custody, visitation, and
legal standing.
Case Name
Wishart et al. v. Boggs
etal.
Beagle et al. v. Beagle
etal.
In the Matter of
Emanuel S.
Hero v. Hero
Fairbanks et ux. v.
McCarter
In the Guardianship of
Nonnan and Others
Stephen v. Nehis
Court
Supreme Court of
Florida
Supreme Court of
Florida
Court of Appeals of
New York
Court of Appeals of
Louisiana
Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine
Court of Appeals of
Maryland
Appeals Court of
Massachusetts
Supreme Court of
Michigan
143Appendix C Remanded Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
statutory requirements
including adoptions,
permission to intervene,
custody, visitation, and
legal standing.
These cases dealt with
conditions of visitation.
Case Name
Howell v. Rogers
Rust v. Buckler
In re the Marriage of
Ruth M. Bolson et al.
In re Interest of Kavlee
C. and Kylee C. v.
Michelle C. and Donald
Y.etal.
Nation v. Nation
In the Matter of
Michelle Annette
Oswald
Court
Supreme Court of
Mississippi
Supreme Court of
Nebraska
Supreme Court of Iowa
Supreme Court of
Nebraska
Supreme Court of
Wyoming
Court of Appeals of
Colorado
144Appendix C - Remanded Cases (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
conditions of visitation.
These cases dealt with
conditions of visitation.
Case Name
In the Matter of the
Guardianship of Nathan
Paul Nemer et p1.
Martin v. Coop
Pillars v. Thompson
Peterson v. Peterson
In re S.B.L.
Micheal et al. v.
Hertzler
Court
Supreme Court of Iowa
Supreme Court of
Mississippi
Supreme Court of New
Mexico
Supreme Court of North
Dakota
Supreme Court of
Vermont
Supreme Court of
Wyoming
145146
Appendix D
No Legal StandingLegal Issue
These cases dealt with
varying statutory
requirements needed to
obtain legal standing.
Appendix D - No Legal Standing
Case Name
Higginbotham and
Higginbotham v.
Higginbotham
Court
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Little v. Little Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
In re the Matter of Court of Civil Appeals
Bridgette Lachae Moms of Alabama
B.R.O. v. (3.C.O. Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Suster v. Arkansas Supreme Court of
Department of HumanArkansas
Services
Vice v. Andrews Supreme Court of
Arkansas
In the Interest of J. W.Court of Appeals of
Colorado
CastegnoCtal. v. TinaSupreme Court of
Wholean et al. Connecticut
147Appendix D - No Legal Standing (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
varying statutory
requirements needed to
obtain legal standing.
Case Name Court
Linda K. v. Alex A. Jr.Family Court of
Delia S. et al. v.
Clavmont
Ruth I. J. & Shirley A.
K. v. James R. M.
Sowers v. Tsamolias
Enos v. Correla
Olson v. Flinn
In the Matter of the
Adoption of the Minor
Identified in Petition
O'Brien v. O'Brien
Delaware
Family Court of
Delaware
Family Court of
Delaware
Supreme Court of
Kansas
Appeals Court of
Massachusetts
Supreme Court of
Mississippi
Supreme Court of
riississippi
Supreme Court of New
Hampshire
148Appendix D - No Legal Standing (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
varying statutory
requirements needed to
obtain legal standing.
Case Name
Mclntwe v. Mclntrye
Sposato v. Sposato
Court
Supreme Court of North
Carolina
Supreme Court of North
Dakota
In re Gibson Supreme Court of Ohio
In the Matter of the Supreme Court of
Adoption of p. D. L. Oklahoma
State exrdCostello v.Supreme Court of
Honorable F.G. CottrellOregon
GushlawCtal. v. Supreme Court of
Rohbaugh et al. Rhode Island
Puleo v. Forgue et al, Supreme Court of
Kasper v. Nordfelt
Rivers v. Gadwah
Rhode Island
Court of Appeals of
Utah
Court of Appeals of
Vermont
149Appendix D - No Legal Standing (Continued)
Legal Issue Case Name Court
These cases dealt with
varying statutory
requirements needed to
obtain legal standing.
These cases dealt with
some aspect of the best
interest of the child
standard.
In re Visitation of TroxelCourt of Appeals of
Washington
DavidJ. &RitaK. v
Theresa K. & Lora Lane.
Hockessin
Family Court of
Delaware
In the Matter of the Supreme Court of
Application of ChristopherOklahoma
Steven Herbst
Intruded upon parental Murray v. Marks
rights
Brooks et al. v. Parkerson
McMain v. Iowa District
Court for Polk County
Inre Schmidt
Family Court of
Delaware
Supreme Court of
Georgia
Supreme Court of Ohio
Supreme Court of Ohio
150151
Appendix E
Denied Grandparent Visitation RightsAppendix E - Denied Grandparent Visitation Rights
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
varying statutory
requirements used to deny
grandparents visitation
rights.
Case Name
Turner v. Turner
Clark v. Leslie
Reed v. Glover
In the Interest ofN. S.
In the Interest of A. M.
B.&T.B.
Bush et al. v. Squellati
etal.
In the Interest of A. C.
and L. C.
In re Lola Francis
McCarty
Court
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Supreme Court of
Arkansas
Court of Appeals of
Colorado
Court of Appeals of
Colorado
Supreme Court of
Illinois
Supreme Court of Iowa
Court of Appeals
Louisiana
152Appendix E - Denied Grandparent Visitation Rights- (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
varying statutory
requirements used to deny
grandparents visitation
rights.
Case Name
Maner et ux. v.
Stephenson
In re the Marriage of
Daniel 0. Bradshaw
Bopp v. Lino
Court
Court of Appeals of
Maryland
Supreme Court of
Montana
Supreme Court of
Nebraska
Thompson v. VanamanSuperior Court of New
Jersey
M. J. Mvarez. ilk/a
Carison. ilk/a Pecka v.
S. R. Carison
In re Adoption of
Rideanour et al.
In re Martin
Brown v. Brown
Supreme Court of North
Dakota
Supreme Court of Ohio
Supreme Court of Ohio
Supreme Court of South
Carolina
'53Appendix E - Denied Grandparent Visitation Rights - (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
varying statutory
requirements used to deny
grandparents visitation
rights.
These cases referred to
issues related to intrusions
upon parental rights.
Case Name
In the Custody ofB. S.
z.-S.
Jimmy S. and Wilma
Jean S. v. Kenneth B
and Phyliss B.
In re the Marriage of
Dawn M. Soergel v.
Soergel
In the Matter of the
Adoption of RDS
Ward v. Ward
Court
Court of Appeals of
Washington
Court of Appeals of
Washington
Supreme Court of
Appeals of West
Virginia
Supreme Court of
Wisconsin
Supreme Court of
Wyoming
Family Court of
Delaware
Simmons v. Simmons Supreme Court of
Tennessee
154Appendix E - Denied Grandparent Visitation Rights- (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases referred to
issues related to intrusions
upon parental rights.
These cases dealt with
some aspect of the best
interest of the child
standard.
Case Name
Hawk v. Hawk
Ellis v. Ellis
Court
Supreme Court of
Tennessee
Family Court of
Delaware
In re the Visitation of Supreme Court of
Herschel Walker Indiana
In re the Visitation of Supreme Court of
Neola B. Kanvick Montana
Morris v. Corzatt Supreme Court of
Nebraska
Eberspacher v. Hulme etSupreme Court of
Nebraska
Steward v. Steward Supreme Court of
Nevada
Strouse v. Olson Supreme Court of South
Dakota
155156
Appendix E - Denied Grandparent Visitation Rights- (Continued)
Legal Issue Case Name Court
These cases dealt with lope v. Kaminski Court of Appeals of
some aspect of the best Texas
interest of the child
standard.
In the Interest of R. N.Court of Appeals of
Texas
These cases dealt with Hawkins v.Haley Court of Appeals of
some aspect of the best Texas
interest of the child
standard.
Williams IIICtal. v. Supreme Court of
Williams IV Virginia157
Appendix F
Granted Grandparent Visitation RightsAppendix F - Granted Grandparent Visitation Rights
Legal Issue Case Name Court
These cases dealt with Hick v. Enlow Supreme Court of
grandparent visitation Kentucky
surviving adoption.
Preston v. Merceori Supreme Court of New
These cases dealt with
grandparents being granted
visitation based on the best
interest of the child
standard.
PuleoV.Forgue et al.
RainesV.Sugg
In the Matter of the
Grandparental
Visitation of C. p. F.
Cynthia M v. Priscilla
C.. Matthew B..
Norman H.
Hampshire
Supreme Court of
Rhode Island
Court of Appeals of
Texas
Supreme Court of
Wisconsin
Family Court of
Delaware
Phillips S. v. Rita A. W.Family Court of
Delaware
158Appendix F - Granted Grandparent Visitation Rights (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases dealt with
grandparents being granted
visitation based on the best
interest of the child
standard.
These cases granted
grandparents' visitation by
upholding the lower court's
decisions.
Case Name Court
Thompson v. VanamanSuperior Court of New
Becker v. Becker
Cockrell v. Sittason
Oliver Talley v. Oliver
Smith Loftin v. Smith
Jersey
Superior Court of New
Jersey
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama
Rudolph et al. v. FloydSupreme Court of
Arkansas
159Appendix FGranted Grandparent Visitation Rights (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases granted
grandparents' visitation by
upholding the lower court's
decisions.
Case Name
Brown v. Brown
in the Marriage of
Candyce & John D.
Perry
Smith Ct al. v. Smith
Cainerlingo v.
Camerlingo
In the Interest of K. R.
King v. King
Court
Supreme Court of
Alaska
Court of Appeal of
California
Family Court of
Delaware
Intermediate Court of
Appeals of Hawaii
Supreme Court of Iowa
Supreme Court of
Kentucky
Beckman et al. v. BoggsCourt of Appeals of
etux.
Settle v. Galloway
In re the Marriage of
Larry D. Jacobson
Maryland
Supreme Court of
Mississippi
Supreme Court of
Montana
160Appendix F - Granted Grandparent Visitation Rights (Continued)
Legal Issue
These cases granted
grandparents' visitation by
upholding the lower court's
decisions.
Case Name
In re the Marriage of
Kathleen A. Kovash
Olson v. Olson
Court
Supreme Court of
Montana
Supreme Court of
Minnesota
Romo Ct al. v. Hickok etSupreme Court of
Montana
Rosse v. Rosse Supreme Court of
Nebraska
Sweeney v. Sweeney etSupreme Court of Ohio
al.
Bishop v. Puller Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania
Stone v. Short Court of Appeals of
Texas
Supreme Court of
Wyoming
161162
Appendix G
Other Issues163
Appendix G - Other Issues
Legal Issue Case Name Court
Statute constitutional Persico et al. v. RussoSupreme Court of
Florida
Reinhardt et al. v. Court of Appeals of
Reindhardt Louisiana
R. T. and M. T. v. J. E.Superior Court of New
and L. E. Jersey
Motion of Consolidation R. K. and L. K. et al- InSuperior Court of New
the Matter of AdoptionJersey
of a Child H. B.
Writ of Prohibition State of West Virginia.Supreme Court of
cx. Rd David Allen B.Appeals of West
v. The Honorable L. Virginia
Sommenlie.. Jr.